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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Social movements have played a significant role in shaping our recent human 
history (Andrews 2002; Burns 1990; Eyerman and Jamison 1991; Tarrow 1998; Whittier 
2003).  The impact of a social movement may lead to revision of governmental or 
business policy, creation or repeal of law, or even the overthrow of a political system.  
The actors in a social movement, typically ordinary people with little individual power, 
seek to make their voices heard by acting collectively to bring about some change.  These 
efforts to instigate change are often met with counteracting efforts to control the social 
movement and maintain the status quo.
In this project, I examine the social control response of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigations (FBI or Bureau) to the Black Panther Party, one of the many organizations 
engaged in the struggle for civil rights during the 1960s and early 1970s.  As the Black 
Panther Party emerged on the national scene, the FBI responded by declaring the 
Panthers a security threat, planning preemptive prosecutions of Panther members under 
firearm and sedition statutes, and attempting to create dissension both within the group 
and with other black activist groups (Churchill and Vander Wall 1990a; Burns 1990).  
These social control tactics have been credited with ultimately destroying the Black 
Panther Party (Churchill and Vander Wall 1990a).  Through document analysis of 
2Federal Bureau of Investigation files, I will explore the interactions between the Black 
Panther Party and the FBI in North Carolina, the manner in which nationally mandated 
social control strategies were carried out at the local level, and the use to which 
information collected by the Charlotte (North Carolina) FBI field office contributed to the 
Bureau’s overall social control goals with respect to the Black Panther Party as a national 
social movement organization.
The Unites States began with a social movement.  Weary of the repression they 
experienced as a British colony, many of the colonists determined to declare their 
independence from the King of England.  Their official statement read:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are 
created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with 
certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness. That, to secure these rights, 
governments are instituted among men, deriving their just 
powers from the consent of the governed; that, whenever 
any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, 
it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it, and to 
institute a new government . . . . [W]hen a long train of 
abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same 
object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute 
despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such 
government, and to provide new guards for their future 
security.
These introductory paragraphs of the Declaration of Independence speak volumes 
about the founding of a nation premised on freedom.  Yet, upon gaining their 
independence from Britain, the new nation was faced with establishing some form of law 
and government to replace British rule.  As other groups had previously discovered, 
establishing a cohesive society subject to governmental rule is quite a different task than 
protesting an established order (Erikson 2005).  The government that once had forcefully 
declared its independence from repression became instead the force of social control.
3Social movements have occupied an important place in the social fabric of the 
United States.  Burns (1990:xii) identifies two types of democracy that coexist in the 
United States: “electoral-representative democracy” and “grass-roots democracy.”  He 
argues that social movements, “grounded in principled activism, moral passion, and 
commitment to substantive purposes,” have historically proven more able to bring about 
social change (Burns 1990:xii).  More often than not, these two faces of democracy have 
been in conflict, a social movement agitating for change while the government seeks to 
maintain the status quo.
The balance between individual rights and freedom and the need for social 
regulation is delicate.  Cries of oppression must be balanced against a government’s 
efforts to allocate scarce resources among citizens and secure social order.  Social 
movements may compete for the same resources, seek incompatible outcomes, or lead to 
a countermovement that also demands to be heard.  In any given case, there will likely be 
many who consider efforts at social control a justified protection of public interest.
Notwithstanding the government’s need to maintain order, social control in the 
United States has too often resulted in the repression of Constitutional rights and the use 
of undue force and deception.  With the distance of time, we look back and wonder how 
the government could have denied women the right to vote for so long, or passed and 
enforced laws institutionalizing discrimination, such as the “separate but equal” doctrine 
and bans on citizenship, or interred Japanese-Americans during World War II, or opened 
fire on protesting students.  In essence, just as a social movement has the capacity to 
influence governmental policy, so too a government has the capacity to encourage, 
4hinder, or even destroy a social movement through the intensity and strategy of its 
response.
Not long after the founding of the United States, activists began the long struggle 
toward equal rights for African Americans.  During the century following the United 
States Civil War, African Americans fought for and slowly gained the right to vote, to 
serve in the military, and to eat, travel and be educated alongside white citizens (Ezra 
2004; Markowitz 2004; Rubinson 2004b).  However, these new legal rights did not end 
the prejudice and discrimination that blacks face on a daily basis.
In the latter part of the 1960s, some civil rights activists grew tired of waiting for 
non-violent strategies to achieve full equality.  Militant groups began to form, vowing to 
seize equality through violence if necessary.  One such group was the Black Panther 
Party.  Founded in 1966, the Black Panther Party sought both to protect the rights of 
African Americans and to strengthen the African American community (Abron 1998; 
Jones and Jeffries 1998; Burns 1990).  Membership in the Black Panther Party expanded 
rapidly, claiming more than 4,000 members and 33 chapters within its first four years 
(Hilliard and Cole 1993).
The Federal Bureau of Investigation responded to these demands for equality and 
suggestions of violence by declaring the Black Panther Party a threat to national security 
(Churchill and Vander Wall 1990b), while the Panthers’ efforts to strengthen black 
communities were reframed as communist programs (Cable News Network 1996).  Local 
FBI offices were directed to use informants to create dissension among Black Panther 
members and between the Black Panther Party and other black activist groups (Churchill 
and Vander Wall 1990a, Burns 1990), and to collect evidence for preemptive legal 
5prosecution of Black Panther members (FBI Files Parts 6a and 11b).  These social control 
tactics of the FBI have been credited with weakening, and ultimately destroying, the 
Black Panther Party (Churchill and Vander Wall 1990a).
In this paper, I will explore the relation between national and local efforts at 
social control.  First, I will review previous studies on social movements and social 
control.  Second, I will explain the methodology of this study.  Next, I provide a brief 
history of the Black Panther Party.  Fourth, I present the data collected through content 
analysis of FBI files.  In the final section, I will discuss my findings and propose some 
possibilities for further research in this area.
6CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
In the broadest sense, social movement theory seeks to provide an explanation of 
why some social movements succeed and others fail.  As such, these theories are of great 
importance to scholars seeking to understand the decisions of agents of social control, as 
they endeavor to prevent the success of a social movement.  This literature review will 
thus first provide a cursory examination of some of the major social movement theories 
which are most heavily implicated in the FBI’s social control efforts, including resource 
mobilization, political opportunity, framing and development of a collective identity.  I 
will then review previous studies on the specific topic of social control, particularly social 
control agents and tactics, social control allocation, and the effects of social control.
Social Movement Theory
The earliest work on social movements viewed them as collective behavior that 
emerged more or less spontaneously among crowds of people (Eyerman and Jamison 
1991:11-15).  Although views differed as to whether this should be seen as positive, 
adaptive behavior or as irrational and deviant, theorists were in consensus that a 
collective identity emerges in a group, an identity which cannot be explained by looking 
at the individual members of the group.  Theorists who focused on the micro level of 
analysis looked for social learning and creativity, internal reform and emergent norms.  
On the other hand, macro level theorists focused instead on strains in society that led to 
collective behavior responses.
7Although social movement theory has expanded beyond the early conceptions of 
collective behavior theory, Snow et al. (1998) recently returned to the strain aspect of 
collective behavior, considering the connection between the breakdown of aspects of 
everyday life that are taken for granted and the emergence of social movements.  Snow et 
al. (1998) argue that breakdown theory, a variation on social strain theory, offers an 
explanation for the emergence of some types of social movements that more fashionable 
social movement theories lack.
While collective behavior spoke more to why social movements emerge, resource 
mobilization theory shifted the focus to how social movement actors mobilize 
(Foweraker 1995).  Resource mobilization sought to answer such questions as how a 
movement organizes, particularly how a movement obtains and manages the resources 
necessary to maintain, and possibly expand, the movement.  Resource mobilization 
theory also provided the means to analyze why some movements succeed where others 
fail (Eyerman and Jamison 1991).  Further, Foweraker (1995:16) identified three 
ancillary arguments stemming from resource mobilization theory: “First, dense social 
networks make mobilization more likely.  Secondly, more prosperity favours social 
mobilization by facilitating resource mobilization in different ways.  Finally, levels of 
prior social organization influence the degree and type of social mobilization.”
With its focus on organization and rationality, resource mobilization generally 
proved more appealing to social movements scholars than the early collective behavior 
theories.  However, the theory of resource mobilization did not develop without criticism.  
According to its critics, resource mobilization theory focuses too narrowly on 
8“instrumental rationality” and a rigid cost-benefit analysis, without sufficient reference to 
the social and political context (Foweraker 1995:17).
The lack of focus on the political context under the resource mobilization 
approach was corrected as scholars developed the political opportunity model (Foweraker 
1995).  Under this approach to social movements study, the political structure is seen as 
“condition[ing] the emergence, strategy and likelihood of success of social movements” 
(Foweraker 1995:19).  Tarrow (1998:71) defines the scope of interest as “the levels and 
types of opportunities people experience, the constraints on their freedom of action, and 
the threats they perceive to their interests and values.”  As potential social movement 
actors perceive an opportunity to bring about change due to the openness of the political 
system or the presence of elite allies, they become more likely to protest (Van Dyke 
2003).  Desai’s (2002) study of the women’s movement in India over three distinct 
phases illustrates the manner in which political structure both shapes a movement and 
impacts its ability to successfully achieve its goals.  
In short, the political opportunity model sought to add to social movement theory 
through examining why movements occur and succeed during specific periods of history.  
This approach adds a new dimension to social movement analysis, but, like resource 
mobilization, it approaches social movements from a macro, structural point of view.  To 
gain a well-rounded picture of a social movement, it is necessary to consider meso and 
micro levels of analysis as well.
Staggenborg (2002:125) suggests that the most appropriate approach to a study of 
social movements is to begin at the meso level of analysis, the level of “‘real action in 
social movements,’” then link to micro and macro processes as appropriate.  She argues 
9that it is critical to focus on meso level community structures to adequately explain social 
movement processes.
One area of focus for social movement scholars has been the concept of 
“framing.”  Framing refers to the manner in which a social movement organization 
(SMO) presents the concrete issue or issues it has selected as a goal, in order to win 
support from those outside the movement (Swarts 2003).  According to Williams 
(2002:249), “frames must tell movement participants what is wrong, what can be done to 
fix it, and why they should be involved. . . .  People must have a sense of an unjust 
situation that must be corrected, a sense that they can have an effect in changing it, and 
an identification of who is responsible for the problem.”
Social movement scholars have also been concerned with the process of identity 
formation.  Collective identity forms the basis for collective action, “a ‘shared definition 
of a group that derives from members’ common interests, experiences, and solidarity’”
(Reger 2002:173). Identity can be chosen and employed for strategic purposes, but is 
also shaped, and even sometimes imposed upon a social movement, by external forces
(Bernstein 2002; Robnett 2002; Klatch 2002).  The formation of a collective identity can 
be especially problematic for diverse groups, where the risk of factionalism is high 
(Reger 2002).  Robnett (2002) has argued for a relational approach in studying collective 
identity, to allow for the interaction of challengers and authorities and the shifting of 
collective identity over time.
Another focus of social movements study has been on the strategizing of 
movements.  Barker and Lavalette (2002) note that the strategy selected by a social 
movement can have an immense impact on the future of the social movement.  Although 
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linked to the other social movements approaches, strategy does not fit cleanly within any 
of these approaches.  Rather, it encompasses the actor’s recognition of structural limits 
and opportunities and their active decision as to what can and should be done to further 
social movement goals (Barker and Lavalette 2002).  Meyer (2004) further articulated the 
link between strategy and other approaches to social movement theory in her study of 
twenty-seven SMOs engaged in peace and conflict resolution in three distinct regions of 
the world.  She theorized that variation in strategy between regions was most likely 
related to different political structures, while variation in strategy within a region could 
best be explained by the organization of the SMO.
The most recent development in social movement theory is toward a synthesis of 
approaches (Meyer 2003; Moodie 2003; Whittier 2003).  Moodie (2003:48) criticizes 
social movement theory as developing “general propositions so abstract as to be either 
tautological or empty,” while overlooking the aspects of agency and reciprocal 
relationships.  Whittier (2003) argues that the distinction between the various approaches 
is largely invoked for literature reviews and theoretical frameworks, but not employed in 
the actual analysis.  Further work must be done to integrate the internal processes of 
social movements not only with the exterior political structure, but also within the context 
of the dominant culture.  Meyer (2003:4-6) notes that the most significant challenges to 
“bridge-building” include uniting perspectives and insights at different levels of analysis, 
linking identity and political process, developing a cross disciplinary approach, testing 
theories across multiple movements and contexts, retaining a focus on policy and valuing 
the ideal of social movements to improve the quality of life.
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Social Control Theory
Social control is implicated in each of the preceding approaches to the study of 
social movements; it delineates the resources available for mobilization and the manner 
in which they are organized, it limits the political opportunities available, it shapes 
collective identity and strategy, it produces counter-frames to challenge those of the 
SMO, and so forth.  However, the concept of social control predates social movement 
theory, dating as far back as the theories of Durkheim and Marx.  Existing literature on 
social control is reviewed below.
Social Control by Private Actors
Although the majority of research into social control of movements has focused 
on control by the political state, Cress and Myers (2004) argue that such a limited focus 
on state control serves to also limit scholars’ attention in the areas of movement strategy 
and outcome to those strategies and outcomes that are pitted against social control efforts. 
One significant area of private social control is through the organization of 
countermovements (Luders 2003), which provide a collective voice for opposing 
arguments.  While sometimes violent, private repression is also accomplished through 
non-violent means.  Earl (2004) argues that it is impossible to fully understand movement 
repression without considering the private response, noting the impact of the Ku Klux 
Klan, White Citizens Councils and lynchings on the Civil Rights movement.  In addition 
to countermovements, Earl notes other forms of private social control as including private 
threats or the preference of elites to support specific protest goals or forms.
12
Ferree (2004) identified ridicule, stigma and silencing as potent forms of 
repression employed against women’s movements.  According to Ferree (2004), ridicule 
occurs at the micro level through verbal attacks and name calling, stigma is utilized at the 
meso level when connection to a group is disvalued thus discouraging identification with 
a movement and its aims, and silencing occurs at the macro level of society typically 
through denial of access to the media.  Morris (1973) focused on a lack of media access 
in her study of coverage of the feminist movement, finding that the movement and 
movement activities receive scant coverage in two Los Angeles newspapers1, and that the 
majority of coverage the movement did receive related to non-local events.
Thus, through countermovements, ridicule, and denial of access to the media or 
other privately controlled resources, private citizens are able to influence a social 
movement’s opportunities for success.  However, social control by governmental 
organizations is often larger in scope and more effective in deterring a social movement, 
due to the relative power held by governmental entities.
Social Control by Governmental Organizations
Existing research on social control by governmental entities addresses numerous 
issues, ranging from the success of social control efforts in destroying a movement to the 
role social control can play, intentionally or unintentionally, in a successful movement 
outcome (Barkan 1984; Cable, Shriver and Hastings 1999; Stotik, Shriver and Cable 
1994).  Other studies have focused on aspects or elements of social control itself, rather 
than studying the impact of social control on a specific movement (Earl, Soule and 
1
 It should be noted that Morris included every mention of the women’s movement in the 
selected newspapers, positive or negative, in her coding.
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McCarthy 2003; Marx 1991, 1981, 1974).  Klein (1992) considered the impact of 
surveillance of social movements not only on movement participants, but on the general 
public and its expectations of liberty and justice.  McCarthy, Britt and Wolfson (1991) 
studied the control aspect of channeling mechanisms on social movements, such as the 
impact of the non-profit provisions of the federal tax code and state charitable solicitation 
laws, which limit the movement’s organization and strategy through incentives rather 
than overt force.  Earl (2003: 46-47) has suggested a multidimensional typology, focused 
on the identity of the repressive agent, the character of the repressive action and whether 
the repressive action is observable, as a framework for further study on the subject of 
social control.  A brief review of the literature on repressive social control in the areas of 
social control tactics, social control allocation and social control effects follows.
Social Control Tactics.  Social control literature frequently focuses on the various 
types of control exercised by authorities, such as appeals to the majority (Cable, Shriver 
and Hastings 1999; Carley 1997), a direct attack on the social movement (Adamek and 
Lewis 2004; Barkan 1984; Carley 1997; Marx 1981; Stotik, Shriver and Cable 1994), or 
intelligence gathering (Carley 1997; Marx 1981).  In their study of social control at a 
nuclear reservation, Cable, Shriver and Hastings (1999:78) found that the government’s 
“economic dominance in the region and its monopoly on information flow” gave the 
government an effective means of social control, even after government errors and cover-
ups came to light.  Carley (1997:168-171) identified “opinion control”—the provision of 
disinformation, propaganda and media manipulation—to be a primary element of the 
FBI’s counterintelligence program with respect to the American Indian Movement.  Marx 
(1979) provided an overview of tactics frequently used to undermine social movements, 
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including the provision of disinformation or propaganda, interference with resources, 
recruitment, and planned public action, or encouragement of conflict within a group or 
between groups.
Direct attack on a social movement can take many forms.  Two common forms of 
direct attack are physical attack and legal attack.  In their study of the American Indian 
Movement, Stotik, Shriver and Cable (1994:66) attributed the failure of the movement, at 
least in part, to direct attack social control efforts of a severe nature, including “legal 
action, FBI infiltration and surveillance, and murder.”  Similarly, Carley (1997:166), in 
his study of the American Indian Movement, identified physical and legal attack as two 
of the means of social control employed by the FBI through its counterintelligence 
program.  Carley noted that the effectiveness of a legal attack on a social movement 
depends as much on the disruption court proceedings cause for a social movement as on 
actual legal success.
The state can also indirectly influence a social movement through its treatment of 
countermovements (Luders 2003).  Noting that some southern states experienced a 
significantly greater number of instances of public violence toward civil rights protesters, 
in spite of having a similar number of non-violent protest events, Luden theorized that the 
state response to public violence must play a role.  He found that states which made some 
effort to control the white response to protest experienced a much lower overall number 
of violent responses, while states which overlooked or encouraged a violent white 
response experienced significant public violence.
According to Marx (1979), the “largest single activity of control” and 
“prerequisite for most other activities” is information gathering. Intelligence gathering 
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can involve tactics as diverse as the use of informants, physical surveillance, tracking of 
computer usage and electronic tracking, with new technology frequently creating new 
means of undercover information gathering (Marx 1991).  Informants not only provide 
information that can be used for social control measures, but also can encourage 
unlawfulness through cooperating in illegal acts or generating motive or opportunity to 
act illegally (Marx 1981:231).  Infiltration by informants played a role in the FBI’s 
counterintelligence program with respect to the American Indian Movement, with 
informants able to encourage the decision to undertake reckless actions, and to create 
dissent and suspicion within the movement (Carley 1997:167-168).
Marx (1974) also questioned why an informant would agree to participate in the 
social control of a movement.  According to Marx (1974), civilian informants may be 
motivated by patriotism, coercion, financial reward or disaffection with movement aims 
or efforts.  The escalation from mere informant to agent provocateur is a natural 
progression, as informants desire to become privy to valuable information and justify 
their position as an informant.  Informants can play an essential role in collecting 
evidence of conspiracy to commit a crime or similar non-violent criminal activity before 
an actual crime occurs, thus allowing the instigation of court action without danger to 
police or the neighboring public.  Additionally, informants can simply act as a means of 
harassing social movement activists, even where no violation of law has occurred (Marx 
1974).
Churchill and Vander Wall (1990a) developed a detailed typology of both the 
forms and functions of various FBI counterintelligence actions.  Cunningham (2003b:55) 
extended their typology, treating form and function independently to create a matrix of 
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possible form-function pairs, which he then used to analyze FBI actions against the New 
Left.  The top 3 functions of the FBI counterintelligence program identified by 
Cunningham under this methodology were the hindrance of individual participation in 
group activities, restriction of the ability to protest and creation of a negative public 
image.  By far, the most common form of action that Cunningham identified was the 
supply of information to officials.  The form-function pair of hindering individual 
participation through supply of information to officials occurred at a rate nearly triple the 
next most frequent form-function pair (Cunningham 2003b), thus emphasizing the 
significant role of information in the Bureau’s strategy for social control.
Allocation of Social Control.  Recent studies have looked at the allocation of 
social control.  Cunningham (2003a) tested the common assumption that there is some 
level of rationality to social control efforts.  His study of the FBI’s counterintelligence 
program with respect to the New Left concluded that, in fact, the presumed element of 
rationality was absent in the case of the New Left.  Because FBI decisions were largely 
made at the national level, social control at the local level in some locations bore little 
correlation to the threat posed by the local social movement unit.  Cunningham’s study 
also provided an explanation for the fact that national movements were more frequently 
the target of the FBI than local movements, even where the activities of the local 
movement might more logically merit control action (Cunningham 2003a:233-234).
Further work by Cunningham (2003b) has addressed the assumption that social 
control is an overt response to social movement activities.  Again using the FBI 
counterintelligence program as an example, Cunningham argues that social control can 
also be covert and proactive, seeking to prevent protest activities rather than just police 
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them.  Cunningham and Browning (2004) analyze the creation of official frames by 
authorities to justify the allocation of social control; for example, counter-subversive 
actions were justified against communist groups to protect the political and economic 
structure of the United States, while black nationalists merited such tactics to counter 
their supposed violent tendencies and proclivity for social disorder.
Earl, Soule and McCarthy (2003), in contrast, tested the common belief that 
police in the 1960s responded to protest activity almost universally with violence and 
repression.  Their study concluded that police forces on the whole only infrequently even 
attended protests, and that police response to protest incidents was, as would seem 
logical, closely related to the threat posed by the protesting group (Earl, Soule and 
McCarthy 2003).
Effects of Social Control. Another area of concern for social movement scholars 
has been the effect of social control efforts on movements.  Barkan (1984) conducted a 
comparative study of the effectiveness of physical and legal attack, comparing the 
effectiveness of violent reactions to the southern civil rights movement with reactions 
involving legal proceedings.  In areas where protest was met with violence, he found that 
the protesters were likely to become sympathetic to others outside the movement, thus 
drawing greater support.  Conversely, in areas where protest was met with legal action, 
repression of the social movement acquired a sense of legitimacy.  Barkan concluded 
that, at least with respect to the specific example of the southern civil rights movement, 
legal control proved a more effective means of social control (Barkan 1984: 562).
Other studies of direct attacks as a means of social control have focused on 
increasing deviance or radicalization as a result.  Adamek and Lewis (1975: 671), in their 
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study of Kent University student activists, found that violent force utilized as a means of 
social control “generally has a radicalizing effect on participants.  Moreover, [the] 
research indicate[d] that this radicalization is relatively long lived.”  Similarly, Marx 
(1981: 222) discussed the risk of escalation, where law enforcement efforts actually lead 
to increasing deviance, in frequency, in severity and in level of commitment.  Marx’s 
study of escalation clearly correlates with social control activities, where repression can 
lead to increasingly frequent and extreme efforts to draw attention to a cause, and to a 
movement participant’s increased commitment to that cause.  Moreover, when society 
becomes frightened of social movements and demands more control, increased dissent 
and violence may occur as a natural result of a broader definition of deviance (Marx 
1974: 431).
Theoretical Framework for this Study
Previous literature in the area of social movements and social control provides the 
framework for this study.  In particular, I draw upon Cunningham’s (2003a) work on the 
allocation of social control at national and local levels, and the work of Cunningham and 
Browning (2004) on official frames.  Together, these two works suggest the need for 
further consideration of the interaction between national and local agencies to establish 
and carry out social control efforts.  
Cunningham (2003a) proposed that decisions regarding the allocation of social 
control resources by agencies such as the FBI are made on a national basis, thus 
allocating more resources to social control of national social movements at the local 
level, even where local branches of the national social movement would not seem to 
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merit the level of social control.  Building upon this premise, I explore the impact of the 
FBI’s decisions regarding social control of the national Black Panther Party on the level 
of social control exerted by a local FBI field office on a local branch of the Black Panther 
Party within North Carolina.
Somewhat similarly, Cunningham and Browning (2004) suggested that an 
important part of social control at the national level is the employment of official frames 
of a social movement that would justify the allocation of higher levels of social control 
and the use of more extreme social control tactics.  Whereas a social movement must 
establish a frame to explain “what is wrong, what can be done to fix it, and why [people] 
should be involved” (Williams 2002:249), these official frames serve as a counter-frame 
to a social movement’s framing of the issues, reinterpreting the social movement’s goals 
and motivations.  Building upon this concept, I examine the FBI’s national frame of the 
Black Panther Party as a violent and extremist group that posed a threat to the United 
States political system.  Further, I analyze the impact of this official frame upon the 
social control activities of the FBI’s Charlotte, North Carolina field office.  Finally, I 
explore the manner in which the Charlotte field office intelligence reports to the FBI 
headquarters served to either reinforce or challenge this official frame. 
Based upon these previous studies, I have constructed the following research 
questions:
1. How did the social control goals and tactics established at the national 
level shape the process of information gathering at the local level?
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2. What information on the Black Panther Party was gathered at the local 
level, and how was this information used to contain the social movement 
activity of the Black Panther Party both locally and nationally? 
3. How did the process of information gathering and reporting create and 
reinforce the local and national frame of the Black Panther Party that the 
FBI sought to establish?
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
Document Analysis
In this project, I will use document analysis of FBI files to examine the interaction 
of national and local FBI forces to repress Black Panther Party activity locally and 
nationally .  Weber (1990:9) defines content analysis as “a research method that uses a set 
of procedures to make valid inferences from text” about the sender, the audience and the 
message itself.  Content analysis may be quantitative, such as categorizing and counting 
textual frequency or other methods to enable statistical analysis of text (Ahuvia 2001; 
Hogenraad, McKenzie and Normand 2003).  Content analysis may also take a more 
qualitative approach, moving beyond transforming text into numerical data.  Altheide 
(1987:67) contrasts quantitative and qualitative approaches to content analysis along 
several dimensions, noting that qualitative analysis is more reflexive and remains focused 
on the narrative and textual analysis, rather than numerical data for statistical analysis.
For this project, data collection will be by means of qualitative document analysis 
of FBI files.  According to Espland (1993:297), “formal documents produced by an 
organization are revealing sources for understanding how power is exerted, legitimated 
and reproduced.”  Further, because document analysis allows the analysis of a longer 
time period than many other methods of analysis, it can reveal changes in the
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organization, including differences in the type of information collected.  Bailey (1978) 
observed that document analysis makes available for study subjects that would otherwise 
be inaccessible, and additionally provides inexpensive access to data.
On the other hand, the lack of context in bureaucratic documents “obliterates 
social relationships,” while standard categorization can mask the differences in events, 
causing them to appear similar (Espland 1993:299).  Additionally, the choice of language 
in official documents can obscure conflict and add an illusion of impartiality.  Another 
potential disadvantage associated with document analysis is that the initial author of the 
document determines the scope of the material; subsequent research is limited by the 
information the author elected to include, as well as any bias of the author.
Concerns Related to Document Source
Data for this paper has been taken from FBI files which have been publicly 
released in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).  This source of data 
presents some limitations.  First, the “completeness of the released files” must be 
questioned (Cunningham 2003: 215).  While it would be difficult to verify that no 
documents were secretly withheld from the file when it was posted, or that no documents 
were lost or removed in previous decades, the FBI file appears to be reasonably complete.  
When sorted by date, there are no obvious gaps in the date sequencing to raise suspicion.  
Moreover, the exceptions built into FOIA allow the FBI to remove or redact published 
documents when necessary in the “interest of national security” or for other enumerated 
reasons (Cunningham 2003:216).  While this creates a second issue in analyzing the 
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documents, the ability to legally withhold certain information should increase confidence 
that documents are not simply missing.
Redacted and withheld information under FOIA does create some difficulty in 
coding (Churchill 2003b; Cunningham 2003:216).  Where entire pages, or possibly entire 
documents, are withheld under a FOIA exception, the FBI file contains a single sheet 
noting the FOIA exception.  For purposes of this study, withheld pages/documents have 
been ignored.  Redacted portions pose less of a problem, as in almost every case it was 
still possible to determine the nature of the documents.  However, such redactions create 
difficulties in performing document analysis, as some of the content of the documents is 
not available.
A final problem, as is possible with any document source, relates simply to 
legibility.  Portions of many of the documents are not entirely legible, but it was possible 
in all but one case to determine the general nature of the document from the portions that 
were legible.  The one document that was so illegible as to be unclassifiable was 
discarded for purposes of this study.
Data Analysis
The FBI file for the Winston-Salem branch of the Black Panther Party is posted 
on the website of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the Electronic Reading Room 
(http://foia.fbi.gov/foiaindex/bpanther.htm).  The file, consisting of 2,895 total pages, is
posted as 15 separate parts in PDF format.  When referenced in this paper, FBI 
documents are identified by part and by PDF page number within the part.
24
The file was separated into individual documents, ranging from a single page to 
lengthy reports.  In total, I identified 724 separate documents, which were then sorted 
according to date2 and purpose, either intelligence gathering/reporting, internal 
procedural matters, or non-intelligence court documents.  Documents which fit within 
multiple categories were placed within the category of their primary purpose.
Documents designated as internal procedural matters include instructions to the 
Field Office from the Director of the FBI regarding emphasis on particular categories of 
information and submission of reports, as well as associated responses or requests for 
direction from the Field Office which do not contain factual intelligence information.  
Also included in the internal procedural category are communications between the FBI 
and other agencies or members of the public which do not contain factual intelligence 
material.  Documents placed in the non-intelligence court related category pertain to 
court proceedings directly involving the FBI.  In one instance, the documents relate to a 
lawsuit filed against the FBI and other governmental agencies stemming from a search 
and arrest.  In a second instance, the documents concern a subpoena served upon an FBI 
agent as a witness for several Panthers on trial.  In each case, the documents reflect the 
logistics of trial proceedings rather than any intelligence efforts.  Documents which 
include intelligence materials relating to prosecutions of the Panthers or civil court 
proceedings by private citizens against the Panthers are not included in this category.
2
  When available, the original document date was used.  If the original date was 
illegible or redacted, the date on which the document was stamped as “received” was 
used instead.  In the few instances when the alternate date was used, it appeared likely 
that the document year remained the same as the year of the original date. One document 
posed a slight problem in that there was no distinguishable date on the document.  
However, as it was located in a subpart consisting entirely of 1969 documents, I felt 
reasonably confident that the document could safely be included in the 1969 totals.
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The remaining documents fall within the intelligence category.  This category 
includes all standard, regularly submitted Field Office reports to the Director as well as 
all other intelligence related material, such as non-standard reports of special events.  
Table 1 reflects the separation of documents into these three categories by year, 1968 to 
1976.  As reflected in Table 1, the vast majority of the documents in the FBI file reflect 
intelligence gathering activity.
Table 1
Year Intelligence Procedural Court Total
1968 3 0 0 3
1969 99 6 17 122
1970 212 13 2 227
1971 222 2 10 234
1972 76 6 0 82 
1973 20 0 0 20 
1974 12 2 0 14
1975 17 4 0 21
1976 1 0 0 1
TOTAL 662 33 29 724
Additionally, the FBI file was broken down into documents generated by the 
Charlotte field office, documents generated by other FBI field offices throughout the 
United States, and documents generated by FBI headquarters.  Although documents 
provided to the Charlotte field office are certainly an important part of the intelligence 
gathering activity and social control efforts of the FBI , their inclusion in annual document 
totals distorts the level of activity within the Charlotte field office.  As shown in Table 2, 
documents generated by other FBI field offices constitute from 25 to 44 % of the total 
documents for the years 1969 to 1972.  All but nine of these documents were produced 
by the San Francisco FBI field office, which had investigative responsibility for Oakland, 
California, location of the Black Panther Party headquarters.  The majority of the San 
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Francisco documents consisted of short memos documenting phone calls made to Panther 
headquarters from North Carolina or shipments of the Black Panther Party newspaper to 
the North Carolina group.  Full details of all the documents summarized in Table 2, 
including the document date, file part and PDF page number, are set forth in Appendices 
A, B and C.
Table 2
Year
FBI
Headquarters
NC Field 
Office
Other FBI 
Field Offices
Total
1968 0 2 1 3
1969 18 73 31 122
1970 12 123 92 227
1971 7 124 103 234
1972 1 58 23 82
1973 0 19 1 20
1974 2 12 0 14
1975 4 17 0 21
1976 0 1 0 1
TOTAL 44 429 251 724
For purposes of this study, I have focused largely on reports submitted to FBI 
headquarters by the Charlotte field office, with some attention as well on documents 
produced by FBI headquarters.  I have used a qualitative approach, reviewing the 
documents for emerging themes centered around the above stated research questions.  
With respect to documents generated by FBI headquarters, I identified sections of 
documents which fell within three general categories: (1) general directions for 
investigation, (2) statements which contribute to an official frame of the Black Panther 
Party as violent and/or extremist, and (3) statements which contribute to an official frame 
of the Black Panther Party as engaged in illegal activities other than violence and 
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sedition.  Documents identified as generated by FBI headquarters did not contain any 
statements that even remotely appeared to reflect positively on the Black Panther Party.
Charlotte field office generated documents were reviewed for content falling into 
any of five categories.  The first category consisted of references to the North Carolina 
branch of the Black Panther Party as violent and/or extremist, while the second category 
consisted of references to illegal but non-violent actions.  These two categories of content 
frequently overlapped throughout the documents, as it was very rare to find a reference to 
illegal activity which was not connected in some way to violent or extremist activity.  
The third category included any references to financial matters of the North Carolina 
group.  Finally, the fourth and fifth categories aim to identify statements on the North 
Carolina group that should fairly be considered as neutral, in the sense that there is no 
reference to illegal or deviant behavior, or as reflecting positively on the North Carolina 
Panthers.
For general reference, to illustrate the ebb and flow of intelligence reporting 
activity by the Charlotte 
field office, Figure 1 
provides a breakdown of 
the change in number of 
documents produced on a 
month-by-month basis for 
the full eight years of 
documents contained in 
the FBI files.  Peaks of reporting activity can generally be associated with specific events, 
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such as a “funeral for justice” planned for August, 1969, or the “Revolutionary Peoples 
Constitutional Convention” in late 1970.  Document totals for these months are inflated 
due to numerous short reports updating changes in schedules and travel plans with 
respect to these events.  January of 1971, on the other hand, appears to simply have been 
a very busy month for Black Panther activity in North Carolina.
How did the information gathered at the local level contribute to social control 
efforts at both the local and national level?  Did the framing of the Black Panther Party as 
a significant national threat appear to influence the manner in which the Charlotte field
office reported on the actions of local Black Panther members?  Did the local office 
report activity which challenged the national FBI frame?  These questions will be 
addressed in the following section of this paper.
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CHAPTER IV
FINDINGS
In this section, I will first provide brief histories of the Black Panther Party and of 
the FBI, as a background for the data analysis which follows.  Next, I examine the social 
control goals of the FBI in North Carolina, as conveyed by documents from FBI 
headquarters to the Charlotte field office, with particular focus on the official FBI frame 
of the Black Panther Party as a violent and extremist organization which merited the 
strictest of social control measures.  With this foundation established, I then return to the 
research questions laid out above and endeavor to illustrate some possible answers 
through data selected from FBI documents originating in the Charlotte field office. 
A History of the Black Panther Party
To fully understand a social movement, one must orient the movement in history 
(Eyerman and Jamison 1991; Green 2000).  Like many other social movements, the 
Black Panther Party has both a vertical and a horizontal historical influence.  The Black 
Panthers were clearly influenced by the long civil rights struggle, dating back to the end 
of the Civil War.  However, they were also shaped by their emergence in the 1960s, an 
era of significant social protest.  The vertical and horizontal history of the Black Panther 
Party is discussed in turn below.
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The Vertical History: The Civil Rights Movement
Following the United States Civil War, a series of Constitutional amendments 
outlawed the practice of slavery and granted African Americans citizenship (Ezra 2004).  
However, new legal restrictions that effectively discriminated against African Americans 
quickly sprang up, particularly in the South, while lynching and other terrorizing 
measures were used to discourage blacks from exercising any rights.  It quickly became 
apparent that the end of slavery had not brought equality.  Even at this early time the 
fledgling civil rights movement did not share a common vision, with some seeking a 
return to Africa, some seeking autonomy within the United States, and still others seeking 
an equal place in the U.S. society (Ezra 2004).
In 1910, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) was founded, focusing initially on defending the rights of African Americans 
and stopping the practice of lynching (Rubinson 2004a).  The NAACP experienced 
success both in courtroom battles and through lobbying efforts.  The organization also 
joined in the fight for equal access to military service for blacks, although the treatment 
of African American soldiers and regiments fell far short of equality while serving during 
the First World War.  This same decade saw an eruption of race riots throughout the 
country, and the significant migration of blacks from the South to other parts of the 
United States.  Even as many African Americans found new hope with their improved 
economic situation, racial tensions throughout the country continued to worsen.  The 
Black Nationalist movement, seeking separation and independence for African 
Americans, continued to grow, while a black labor movement began fighting for worker’s 
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rights.  African Americans were also recruited and welcomed by communist and socialist 
movements in the United States (Rubinson 2004a).
In the 1930s, the NAACP began a series of legal challenges to the “separate but 
equal” doctrine (Markowitz 2004).  Although the lawsuits failed to secure a change in the 
law at the time, they were an important step toward the ultimate success with Brown v. 
Board of Education (1954).  Another significant event in the 1930s was the rise to power 
of Adolf Hitler in Germany.  While the extreme racism espoused by Hitler and his Nazi 
followers found some supporters in other parts of the world, it also “undermined the 
legitimacy and normality of racist ideas and practices for millions of Americans” 
(Markowitz 2004:164).  As with the First World War, the Second World War saw racial 
discrimination with the armed forces and protest and rioting on the home front.
Markowitz (2004) argues that the Cold War era following World War II proved 
an important era for the civil rights movement.  At the same time the U.S. government 
and its allies were fighting communism, they also recognized that the communist anti-
racist stance could prove appealing to oppressed minorities in the United States.  Cold 
War sentiments provided a foundation for increased repression, and many of the militant 
civil rights defenders were targeted.  Blacks also lost economic ground following the war, 
earning on average only 54% the income of whites.  At the same time, however, African 
Americans were increasingly represented in federal and state governmental positions and 
continued to win important court rulings toward equality.  Furthermore, the federal 
government established a commission on race relations that prepared a report in defense 
of equal rights.  All of these factors, and indeed the entire history of struggle for racial 
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equality, combined to prepare the way for the rampant activism of the 1960s era 
(Markowitz 2004).
In 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court announced its decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education, overturning the “separate but equal” doctrine that had been in effect for more 
than 50 years (Rubinson 2004b).  Although the Brown decision would take more than a 
decade to be fully implemented and enforced, the ruling ushered in an era of increased 
protest.  Rosa Parks refused to give up her seat on a bus, leading to an organized bus 
boycott that drew upon the existing social movement network in the area.  Black students 
persistently returned to formerly white schools in an effort to enroll, despite significant 
threats of bodily harm.  Numerous sit-in protests were held in segregated lunch counters, 
parks, and so forth.  “Freedom Riders” organized integrated bus rides into the South.  
Civil Rights groups also organized marches in various locations, sometimes using 
children as young as six years old.  Throughout all of these efforts, the Civil Rights 
groups hoped for non-violent means of expressing their resistance to segregation, even as 
they expected and often encountered violent reactions from the local public and the 
police.  Civil Rights leaders hoped that these violent responses, captured and broadcast 
on television in many instances, would win the support of moderate viewers (Rubinson 
2004b).
Although the strategy of non-violent protest led to some victories, including the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, some in the movement grew 
tired of struggling and waiting for the legal changes to effect real change in attitudes and 
interactions (Rubinson 2004b).  In spite of the new laws, racism and oppression de jure 
had merely been traded for racism and oppression de facto.  Different factions of the 
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Civil Rights movement turned toward a more militant stance, seeking black power over 
the earlier goals of harmonious integration.  One of these militant Civil Rights 
organizations was the Black Panther Party.
The Horizontal History: The 1960s
Burns (1990:xi) credits the social activism of the 1960s era with “abolishing legal 
segregation, ending the Vietnam War, dislodging racial and sexual discrimination, and 
altering traditional gender roles,” or at least with establishing the impetus to reach these 
goals in the near future.  As with the fight for Civil Rights, most of the social movements 
that coalesced during this time period had their own rich history of struggle.  Further, 
although significant social change was brought about during this period, the struggle for 
equal rights for minorities continues to this day.  However, there can be no question that 
the era of the 1960s was marked by significant social activism.  While the various 
movements had different goals, they were also linked, sharing common ideals and a 
mutual influence.   At the same time, there was disagreement among factions within 
various social movements, as disagreement as to strategy and tactics emerged.  
One of the driving forces behind social movements in the United States has been 
the conflict between social reality and the proclaimed American values of justice, liberty 
and equality for all (Burns 1990:xiv).  This clash of values and reality moved to the 
forefront in the period following the Second World War, as white males achieved an 
increasing prosperity while racial minorities and women were largely excluded from the 
expanding industry.  Additionally, mass media, particularly television, changed the way 
news was disseminated, allowing movements to reach a larger audience.  Regardless of 
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each movement’s success in achieving its expressed goals, Burns (1990:174) argues that 
the collective impact of the 1960s era “reshaped the political and cultural landscape.”
The Emergence of the Black Panther Party 
The Black Panther Party was born in this era of social activism, founded by 
Bobby Seale and Huey Newton in October of 1966 (Hayes and Kiene 1998:159).  The 
black panther, which was already in use by another organization, was adopted as the 
fitting symbol of their beliefs.  According to Newton, a cornered panther would try to 
escape to the left or right, but eventually would come out fighting to escape oppression, 
just as the new organization intended to do (Cable News Network 1996).  The Black 
Panther Party sought to enforce rights under the U.S. Constitution and existing law, 
infamously patrolling the police to guard against police brutality (Burns 1990:49).  
Newton, a law student, researched California law so that the Panthers would be certain to 
remain within its limits (Cable News Network 1996).
Weary of what they considered to be minor progress by non-violent civil rights 
activists, Seale and Newton demanded power and equality, and voiced a determination to 
protect their rights with violence as necessary (Cable News Network 1996; Public 
Broadcasting Service 1998).  The Black Panther Ten-Point Program, a statement of key 
grievances, illustrates the founders’ objections to the current state of affairs in the United 
States:
1. We want freedom.  We want power to determine the destiny 
of our black community.
2. We want full employment for our people.
3. We want an end to the robbery by the capitalists of our black 
community.
4. We want decent housing fit for the shelter of human beings
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5. We want education for our people that exposes the true 
nature of this decadent American society.  We want 
education that teaches us our true history and our role in the 
present-day situation.
6. We want all black men to be exempt from military service.
7. We want an immediate end to police brutality and murder of 
black people.
8. We want freedom for all black men held in federal, state, 
county and city prisons and jails.
9. We want all black people when brought to trial to be tried in 
court by a jury of their peer group or people from their black 
communities, as defined by the Constitution of the United 
States.
10. We want land, bread, housing, education, clothing, justice 
and peace.
(Source: Appendix A, The Black Panther Party [Reconsidered]).  Interestingly, the Black Panther 
Party incorporated parts of the Declaration of Independence into their Ten-Point Program, 
effectively declaring that the United States had not lived up to the ideals on which it was founded.
While people are generally familiar with the Panthers’ views on the necessity of 
armed resistance (Jones and Jeffries 1998: 27), the Panthers also espoused a commitment 
to community service, including programs to provide breakfast to children, provide 
clothing and food to the poor, and medical programs including sickle cell anemia 
research and testing and an ambulance service (Abron 1998; Jones and Jeffries 1998).  
Moreover, the Party encouraged its members to be self-reliant (Rubinson 2004b), 
discouraged use of narcotics and unnecessary violence, and required its members to abide 
by set rules and principles covering everything from being polite to becoming politically 
knowledgeable (Jones and Jeffries 1998).
In its first four years of existence, the Black Panther Party claimed growth from 
twelve members, producing a sporadic newspaper and with no survival programs in 
place, to four thousand members in thirty-three chapters, a weekly newspaper, and with 
survival programs ranging from free Breakfast for Children to legal and medical services
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(Hilliard and Cole 1993: 3).  There can be no question that the platform established by 
Newton and Seale appealed to many black activists.  One study comparing characteristics 
of black youth who supported the Black Panther Party with black youth who supported 
the NAACP found that:
Panther supporters were more distrustful of whites, more 
inclined to support separation of the United States into ‘two 
nations, one black and one white,’ less favorable toward the 
police, more inclined to reject non-violence, more inclined 
to see ‘guerilla warfare’ as a means to help black people, 
less expectant that black-white problems will be peacefully 
and constructively resolved, and more fatalistic about the 
chances that ‘people like me’ have to succeed in life.
(Levine et al. 1973: 31).  Thus, the Black Panther Party established a voice for those who 
rejected the non-violent approach of earlier generations.
The Black Panther Party in North Carolina.  In 1969, the Black Panther Party 
began purging members who were suspected of being informants; as an associated 
measure, the Black Panther Party initiated a ban on new membership for a time
(Calloway 1977: 69).  Although the FBI file labels the Winston-Salem group as members 
of the Black Panthers from the beginning, the documents within the file reflect that the 
group was not officially affiliated with the Black Panther Party at the opening of the file 
in October of 1968 (FBI Files, Part 1, pp. 130-133, 73-79).  The Winston-Salem group 
first affiliated with the Black Panther Party as a chapter of the National Committee to 
Combat Fascism (NCCF) sometime in late 1969 (FBI Files, Part 5c, pp.63-64).  Although 
the precise date is not clear, at some subsequent point the Winston-Salem group became 
an official chapter of the Black Panther Party.
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The FBI files paint an interesting picture of the Winston-Salem branch of the 
Black Panther Party.  The chapter suffered significant financial difficulties throughout the 
investigation period, borrowing money from Black Panther Party headquarters and 
frequently falling behind on its payments for the Black Panther newspaper, rent and 
phone bills (FBI Files, Part 6c, pp. 22-24, 64-65).  A need for bail money for members 
was frequently cited as a reason for the money shortages (FBI Files, Part 11b; pp. 91-92; 
Part 13b, 62-63).  The branch stole a meat truck at one point, leading to the arrest and 
prosecution of several members (FBI Files, Part 9b, pp.4-5), and at another time allegedly 
contemplated armed robbery to ease its financial woes (FBI Files, Part 12, pp. 162-165).  
Additionally, the branch had at least two violent run-ins with law enforcement or 
local citizens.  In August of 1969, after a local restaurant owner allegedly attacked a 
member who refused to leave the premises, members of the group reportedly returned to 
the restaurant with guns and shot at the owner and his son (FBI Files, Part 3b, pp. 67-71).  
Five teenaged members were also involved in a shootout with police officers in February 
1971, when the officers attempted to evict the group from an apartment (FBI Files, Part 
11b, pp. 27-29).
In spite of these difficulties, the Winston-Salem chapter initiated a number of 
Black Panther community service programs, including the Breakfast for Children 
program (FBI Files, Part 13a, pp. 22-25), a sickle cell anemia program (FBI Files, Part 
14b, pp. 12-13) and a free community ambulance service (FBI Files, Part 15c, pp. 30-31).  
In sum, the Winston-Salem chapter appears to adequately illustrate both the militant and 
community service orientations of the Black Panther Party as a whole.
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A History of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
The FBI was founded in 1908 as a small group of special agents working under 
the Department of Justice (Office of Public and Congressional Affairs 1994).  Originally 
named the Bureau of Investigation, it focused on “violations of laws involving national 
banking, bankruptcy, naturalization, antitrust, peonage, and land fraud” (Office of Public 
and Congressional Affairs 1994:2-3).  While the organization increased in number of 
agents over the next few decades, even temporarily expanding in scope during the World 
War I years, big changes did not come until the appointment of J. Edgar Hoover as 
Director in 1924 (Federal Bureau of Investigation 1990).  Hoover is credited with 
bureaucratizing the organization and instituting new training requirements and 
investigative procedures (Office of Public and Congressional Affairs 1994). Conversely, 
Hoover has been criticized for the level of power and control he seized once established 
as Director (Theoharis and Cox 1988:158-169).
The FBI increased in power as fear of communist groups increased and World 
War II became a real threat.  Hoover was a strong supporter of the Smith Act of 19403, 
the anti-sedition statute that provided, in essence, a legal foundation for FBI investigation 
of anyone Hoover deemed a threat to national security (Gentry 1991). This fear of 
communist forces would continue throughout the war and into the decades following, 
providing both focus for the Bureau and justification for its continued growth.  In the 
period before the United States entered World War II, Hoover reportedly secured near-
blanket Presidential permission to conduct secret wiretapping surveillance on anyone 
suspected of subversive activities (Theoharis and Cox 1988:171). Subsequently, in 1956
3
 The current version of the Smith Act is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2385.  
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under Hoover’s direction, the FBI moved beyond simple investigation and into 
counterintelligence programs, actively seeking to destroy the selected subjects (Gentry 
1991).  Hoover was purportedly able to avoid much of the oversight to which the FBI 
theoretically would have been subject through claims that such oversight could 
compromise the Bureau’s work, and in other cases kept separate records of the FBI’s 
more questionable and potentially politically harmful activities (Theoharis and Cox 
1988:258, 267).
By the arrival of the 1960s era, “[b]ecause of the crime, the violence, the civil 
rights issues, and the domestic intelligence consequences” (Office of Public and 
Congressional Affairs 1994:15), or alternatively because of the propaganda and illegal 
activities Hoover engaged in (Theoharis and Cox 1988:328-332), the FBI was in position 
to play a huge role in the social control efforts directed toward numerous emerging social 
movement organizations.
Hoover died on May 2, 1972, approximately half way through the investigative 
period of the Charlotte Black Panther files, having served as Director of the FBI for 
nearly 48 years (Office of Public and Congressional Affairs 1994).  Although the FBI 
grew in power and authority exponentially during his tenure, the subsequent Director 
would not control the same empire, due to changing laws such as the Freedom of 
Information Act (Theoharis and Cox 1988:431), and the changing political and social 
environment of the country.  However, by this time, the FBI had largely succeeded in 
damaging the Black Panther movement and other targeted social movement organizations 
of the Sixties era.
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The FBI and Social Control of the Black Panther Party.  
The Black Panther Party triggered extreme efforts at social control at a national 
level.  Churchill and Vander Wall (1990a:63) quote a “Special Report” in 1970 as 
describing the Black Panther Party as “the most active and dangerous black extremist 
group in the United States.”  Hoover referred to the Panthers as “‘the greatest threat to the 
internal security of the country’” (Gentry 1991:618; Churchill and Vander Wall 
1990b:123).  Even the apparently positive social programs were attacked, with Hoover 
referring to the Breakfast for Children program as “communist-inspired” (Cable News 
Network 1996), and an “effort to create an image of civility . . . and to fill adolescent 
children with their insidious poison” (Gentry 1991).  He reportedly instructed his agents 
“‘to exploit all avenues of creating . . . dissension within the ranks of the BPP . . . 
recipient offices are instructed to submit imaginative and hard-hitting counterintelligence 
measures aimed at crippling the BPP’” (Churchill and Vander Wall 1990a:63).  Churchill 
and Vander Wall (1990a) credit the FBI counterintelligence program as playing a key 
role in the deaths of several high ranking Panthers.  Grady-Willis (1998) thoroughly 
details the history of arrests and incarceration of Black Panther Party members, whom he 
considers to be political prisoners.  Alternatively, Jeffries (2002) provides an in-depth 
look at the scope of repression levied against the Black Panther Party’s Baltimore 
chapter, including legal, covert and violent repression.
The FBI also sought to derail any level of cooperation among Black Nationalist 
groups and to increase dissension among civil rights factions (Burns 1990; Churchill and 
Vander Wall 1990b).  One favored tactic was the use of anonymous mailings to sow 
distrust between groups, which on occasion provoked violent battles between groups.  
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FBI informants also provided information to facilitate raids on Panther offices and 
residences, sometimes resulting in the injury or death of Panther leaders and members.  
The FBI further reportedly encouraged criminal prosecution of Party members whenever 
possible, with the trials disrupting the organization even when acquittals followed.  
Within the Party itself, the FBI spread rumors that various members were FBI infiltrators 
to create distrust and forged documents to produce suspicion of each other among 
Panther leaders (Burns 1990; Churchill and Vander Wall 1990b).  The scope of FBI 
tactics portrays a focused and unrelenting effort to destroy the Black Panther Party.
Interestingly, in spite of all the documentary evidence cited in studies such as those 
reviewed herein, the “Abridged History of the Federal Bureau of Investigation” published 
by the Department of Justice claims that “[w]iretapping and other intrusive techniques 
were discouraged by Hoover in the mid-1960s . . .” (Office of Public and Congressional 
Affairs 1994).
The FBI’s Social Control Goals in North Carolina.  FBI documents included in 
the file for the Winston-Salem branch of the Black Panther Party clearly indicate the 
social control goals of the Bureau.  One purpose behind intelligence gathering was to be 
forewarned of planned activities, particularly incidents which had the potential to become 
violent:
You should in the future advise the Bureau by 
appropriate expeditious communication of information 
developed which could lead to confrontation between 
police and members of the BPP. . . .
With the establishment of a “Community 
Information Center,” in High Point, North Carolina, by the 
Winston-Salem, North Carolina NCCF chapter, you should 
intensify your informant coverage at both locations so 
that you can be informed in advance of what actions are 
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contemplated by members and officials of this 
organization.  It would have been highly significant to 
know in advance whether or not members plan to engage 
in a shoot-out if local authorities attempted to serve 
eviction notice. . . .
(FBI Files, Part 11b, pp.20-21; emphasis added).  
However, the FBI was not solely interested in the prevention of violence, but also 
hoped to find grounds to legally prosecute Panther members:  
. . . Both offices should bear in mind the possibility 
subjects’ presence in the Charlotte area may be in 
furtherance of BPP organizational activities in that area and 
that their efforts in this regard, as well as in connection 
with any violent activities arising out of local school 
integration policy demonstration, may constitute violations 
of Federal laws including the Antiriot statutes.
. . . [A]lso be alert to the development of 
information in his regard to indicate possible violations of 
existing Federal firearm statutes. . . .
(FBI Files, Part 3b, pp. 80-81).  Instructions to track shipments of Black Panther 
newspapers and other publications also provide insight into the Bureau’s more covert 
goal:
The Department, in connection with efforts to 
develop a prosecutive theory against the BPP for the 
violation of security statutes, has previously requested this 
Bureau to develop evidence regarding documents of the 
BPP which urge its revolutionary doctrines and to also 
develop evidence showing a cohesion or unity between 
national headquarters of the BPP and its chapters and 
affiliates. . . .
It is anticipated that in the event of prosecution of 
the BPP, it may be extremely important to be able to 
conclusively prove that a specific BPP publication 
containing revolutionary doctrines was in fact shipped by 
the BPP to various BPP members and/or supporters.  
Accordingly, it is essential that this Bureau develop 
evidence of this nature in order to support possible 
prosecution of the BPP. . . .
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(FBI Files, Part 6a, p.73; emphasis added).
A January 5, 1070, teletype from the Director requested that Charlotte arrange 
interviews with informants and an attorney appointed to “evaluate prosecutive potential 
under Smith Act” (FBI Files, Part 4b, p 63).  The Smith Act, an anti-sedition statute, 
prohibits advocating the overthrow of the government, publishing any printed matter 
which advocates the overthrow of the government, or organizing any group which 
advocates the overthrow of the government.  Previous versions of Sedition Acts during 
the history of the United States frequently had been used to prosecute and incarcerate 
critics of government policy, even where such critics had done nothing more than voice 
objections through speech or print (Kohn 1994; Miller 1951), so it is within reason to 
speculate that the Bureau hoped to prosecute members of the Black Panther Party even 
absent any violence on their part.  At the time of the FBI investigation into the Black 
Panther Party, violation of this statute was punishable by a fine of up to $20,000.00 or a 
prison sentence of up to 20 years.  The FBI’s references to the Smith Act of 1940 and 
instructions from the Director to keep in mind possible weapons violations and security 
statutes illustrate the FBI’s goal to find evidence under which members of the Black 
Panther Party could be prosecuted criminally.
The Official FBI Frame of the Black Panther Party.  The FBI’s official frame of 
the Black Panther Party as violence prone, extremist and a significant threat to national 
security has been referenced throughout this paper.  This same official frame is 
established within the Charlotte field office files in documents produced by FBI 
headquarters.  The earliest dated document from headquarters includes a statement that 
“[t]he violence-prone, black extremist BPP has recently sent organizers to Greensboro, 
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North Carolina, where BPP was organized, a guerilla training session was held on a 
college campus and plans were discussed to shoot police with rifles” (FBI Files, Part 1, p. 
116).  Other Headquarters documents provide characterizations of Black Panther 
members as “practically threatening” local government officials (FBI Files, Part 1, p. 
111) or as being in possession of a weapon at all times (FBI Files, Part 1, p. 107).  A 
letter over the signature of Hoover to an unidentified citizen of Winston-Salem, who had 
written to complain about the Panthers, states “the FBI conducts a considerable amount 
of investigation regarding the activities of those individuals and organizations which seek 
to undermine our basic freedoms and threaten the internal security of our country” (FBI 
Files, Part 4b, p. 1).
The majority of regular Charlotte field office reports (excluding short memoranda 
documenting breaking intelligence) include the attachment of an Appendix containing a 
characterization of the Black Panther Party.  Based upon instructions from FBI 
headquarters to the Charlotte office to update their version of the appendix (FBI Files, 
Part 15b, p. 41), it would appear likely that these appendices either originated from FBI 
headquarters or were implemented nationwide following development in one of the field 
offices.  The original Black Panther Party characterization, included with reports from the 
inception of the file through late 1970, stated that co-founder Huey Newton was 
imprisoned on a manslaughter conviction in connection with the death of a police officer, 
indicated that violence toward police is a central aspect of the Black Panther Party, tied
the Black Panther Party to communist teachings, and included a quote from the Black 
Panther Party newspaper regarding the overthrow of the United States Government (FBI 
Files, Part 1, p. 61).  The items included in this one-page characterization of the Black 
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Panthers clearly demonstrate the official frame put forth by the FBI.  Of note, there is no 
mention in this characterization of the Panthers of any of the community service 
programs the Black Panther Party had enacted.
An updated characterization of the Black Panther Party, for attachment to reports, 
appears in the file near the end of 1970.  The revised version dropped the information 
regarding Huey Newton’s manslaughter conviction and imprisonment, as his conviction 
had been reversed on appeal, but retained references to guerilla tactics and violence 
toward the police.  Additionally, the new appendix adds quotes from new Panther leaders 
David Hilliard:
We advocate the very direct overthrow of the government 
by way of force and violence.
and Emory Douglas:
The only way to make this racist US government 
administer justice to the people it is oppressing, is . . . by 
taking up arms against this government, killing the 
officials, until the reactionary forces . . . are dead, and those 
that are left turn their weapons on their superiors, thereby 
passing revolutionary judgment against the number one 
enemy of all mankind, the racist U.S. government.
(FBI Files, Part 8a, p. 12).  This modification of the standard characterization of the 
Black Panther Party certainly does not represent any softening in the official frame of the 
group.  Again, there is no mention of any of the positive aspects of the Panther platform.
A new appendix appears at the end of a Charlotte document dated September 16, 
1974 (FBI Files, Part 15b, p. 40).  In this version of the appendix, the official FBI frame 
finally acknowledges the Black Panther Party community programs and the less militant 
stance of the later years.  However, the overall picture of the Panthers continues to be of a 
revolutionary group seeking the overthrow of the U.S. government:
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. . . The Party operates the Black Panther International 
News Service (BPINS), which publishes a newspaper 
called “The Black Panther,” which at one time openly 
advocated the use of guns and guerilla tactics in a 
revolutionary program to end oppression of the black 
people, but since early 1971 has spoken for a survival 
program pending revolution.
David Hilliard, quoted in the “New York Times,” 
edition of September 13, 1969, stated, “We advocate the 
very direct overthrow of the Government by way of force 
and violence.”
In the April 25, 1970, edition of “The Black 
Panther,” an article advocated the taking up of arms against 
the Government, killing officials, “thereby passing 
revolutionary judgment against the number one enemy of  
all mankind, the racist U.S. Government.”
During the years 1971-1973, the Party leadership 
has avoided such extreme statements in favor of calling for 
action within the established order and urging unity in the 
black community. . . .
However, during an interview in January, 1972, 
Newton commented that the current social system will 
probably have to be destroyed in the long run, but “we 
can’t deal with it before it is time to deal with it.”
In an interview appearing in the May, 1973 edition 
of “Playboy” magazine, Newton said that the Panthers’ 
“chief ambition is to change the American government by 
any means necessary,” but said he felt that “ultimately it 
will be through armed violence, because the American 
ruling class will not give up without a bitter struggle.”
(FBI Files, Part, 15b, p. 40).  It is interesting that, while acknowledging at least an 
outward change in the Panthers’ stance “since early 1971”, this characterization of the 
Black Panther Party retains quotes from 1969 and 1970 that paint the Panthers as a 
violent group.  Moreover, even in acknowledging the change in the groups’ approach to 
bringing about change, the appendix leaves little doubt that the FBI still considers the 
Black Panther Party a revolutionary threat.
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The official characterization of the Black Panther Party was updated again in 
early 1975.  With this revision, the quotes from the Panthers’ early years were dropped in 
favor of the following statements:
. . . While openly advocating direct overthrow of the U.S. 
Government by force and violence until 1971, leaders have since 
avoided extreme statements in favor of calling for action within the 
established order.  Newton, in an interview appearing in the May, 
1973, issue of “Playboy” magazine, stated the Panthers’ chief 
ambition is to change the American Government by any means 
necessary but that ultimately the change will be through armed 
violence.
Despite its claimed dedication to community service, 
indicators of the BPP’s continued attraction to violence persist. . . .
(FBI Files, Part 15a, p. 63).  Two items are of particular note in this version of the 
appendix.  First, where the “Playboy” magazine quote from Huey Newton in the previous 
version of the appendix indicated that Newton “felt” the desired change in the 
government would result from violence, this version of the appendix indicates that 
Newton said the change “will” result from violence.  While this is only a small difference 
in wording, in the first instance there is the implication that Newton personally believes 
violence will be necessary, while in the second instance the implication is that the Black
Panther Party continues to plan a violent revolution.  The second item of note in this 
version of the appendix is the reference to the Panthers’ “claimed” focus on community 
service, a rather strong suggestion that the community programs started by the Black 
Panther Party were nothing but a cover.
The final version of the appendix characterization of the Panthers is found 
attached to the penultimate Charlotte field office report.  This version is almost identical 
to the previous version, except that the final paragraph documenting the Panthers’ 
“continued attraction to violence” has been deleted from the characterization.  However, 
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the final version of the appendix does retain the Huey Newton “Playboy” magazine 
quote, with its reference to a violent revolution. Thus, although the official 
characterization of the Black Panther Party went through several revisions during the 
investigative period of the Charlotte field office files, the FBI frame of the Panthers as a 
violent and extremist revolutionary group persisted.
The Influence of Nationally Mandated Goals on Local Intelligence Gathering
The first research question proposed in this study asks how the social control 
goals and tactics established at the national level shaped information gathering at the 
local level.  Charlotte field office documents closely follow the FBI goals identified 
previously as (1) to warn of impending activity, (2) to provide evidence for prosecutions 
under the Smith Act, and (3) to provide evidence for possible weapons violations charges 
under local and state statutes.  Each of these goals is addressed in turn.
Warning of Impending Activity.
The FBI Files include many informant reports of imminent violent episodes, 
which the Charlotte office was then able to share with other local law enforcement 
agencies.  In May of 1969, Charlotte reported on a planned rally, with organizers hoping 
for a “police confrontation,” adding a note at the end of the report that “local and state 
authorities [were] cognizant.  Military and secret service advised” (FBI Files, Part 1, pp. 
65-66).  Similarly, a November 1972 letter in the file indicated that the Winston-Salem 
Panthers were planning some form of violence in connection with the December trial of 
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several members, and also advised that the Panthers were believed to have conducted 
their own surveillance activities on FBI agents (FBI Files, Part 14a, pp. 36-37).
FBI reports were not limited to events where violence was anticipated.  Rather, 
the Charlotte field office also reported on and shared intelligence regarding planned 
rallies and demonstrations (FBI Files, Part 1, p. 66; FBI Files, Part 2b, p. 45; FBI Files, 
Part 3b, pp. 12-14; FBI Files, Part 3b, p. 83; FBI File, Part 4a, pp. 32-34).
Interestingly, I did not locate any reports within the Charlotte files which would 
suggest that any identified plans for violence were actually carried out, nor that any such 
informant warnings allowed either local police forces or the local FBI office to prevent a 
violent episode that the Black Panther Party had allegedly planned.  However, this would 
still seem to be a legitimate FBI activity, as one would not expect a law enforcement 
agency to ignore intelligence of possible violent or confrontational activities planned by 
any group.  On the other hand, the remaining stated goals of the FBI, collecting evidence 
for possible preemptive prosecutions under sedition and firearm statutes, have more of a 
feel of active repression than mere law enforcement.  
Evidence for Prosecutions under the Smith Act of 1940.
The Charlotte field office unquestionably followed instructions to search out 
evidence for possible use in the prosecution of members of the Black Panther Party under 
the Smith Act of 1940.  The FBI Files reveal 7 reports4 designed specifically to collate
information allegedly evidencing a conspiracy to commit sedition, and these are 
4 FBI Files, Part 6c p. 70-Part 6d p. 20; FBI Files, Part 7a, pp. 62-98; FBI Files, Part 7b, 
pp. 36-98; FBI Files, Part 8a, pp. 42-78; FBI Files, Part 8b, pp. 30-55; Part 10a, p. 3-
Part 10b, p. 87; FBI Files, Part 12, pp. 3-146;
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consistently the most lengthy and comprehensive reports in the file.  Smith Act reports 
were submitted by the Charlotte field office in May, August, September, October and
November of 1970, and January and April of 1971.  
The Table of Contents for each of these reports sets forth the same five categories 
of information to be included: (1) Revolutionary Program and Policies as Expressed by 
Black Panther Party Leaders, (2) Acts in Furtherance of the Revolutionary Program or 
Policies, (3) Teaching of the Revolutionary Program, (4) Documents Urging the 
Revolutionary Program, and (5) Evidence of National Unity. Copies of letters and 
summaries or transcripts of speeches and press conferences largely constituted the 
category of Revolutionary Program and Policies as Expressed by Black Panther Party 
Leaders.  Under the category of Acts in Furtherance of the Revolutionary Program or 
Policies, the Charlotte field office summarized violent activities that occurred during the 
investigative period of the report which were reported in the Black Panther Party 
newspaper, including copies of articles with each summary.  Teaching of the 
Revolutionary Program typically focused on summaries of the political education and 
liberation school programs, as well as identifying new participants in these programs.  
The fourth category, Documents Urging the Revolutionary Program, included copies of 
leaflets, pamphlets and flyers which appeared in the local area during the reporting 
period.  The final category of Evidence of National Unity provided additional articles 
from the Black Panther Party newspaper, particularly articles regarding events in the 
North Carolina area, along with a general statement regarding newspaper sales in the 
area.
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This emphasis on reporting intelligence specifically in the context of Smith Act 
violations illuminates just how seriously the FBI stressed the goal of a preemptive 
prosecution for sedition.  The Charlotte field office Smith Act reports for the most part do 
not include unique intelligence information, but rather synthesize previously reported 
information that has evidentiary value for a Smith Act prosecution in a single document.  
The most logical explanation for the continued submission of these reports is that 
Charlotte was following a national mandate to collect this information.
Evidence for Firearms Prosecutions.
Although the FBI Files are unclear on whether FBI intelligence ever actually 
provided evidence for a legal prosecution of North Carolina Panthers, the Charlotte field 
office documents reflect a constant focus on the question of possession of weapons by 
North Carolina Panthers.  Reports frequently include a section devoted to the topic of 
weapons acquisition, with entries such as “observed in possession of a small caliber 
pistol” and “each carrying a shotgun.  [Redacted] had on a hunting jacket with shotgun 
shells in the designated slots in the jacket” (FBI Files, Part 1, p. 33).  In September of 
1970, the Charlotte office reported that the Panthers were barricading their local 
headquarters, except for “gun ports,” based upon “[a] composite of information from 
confidential sources” (FBI Files, Part 7a, p. 30).  Ten days later it was “reported that the 
BPP Headquarters has been sandbagged inside with the windows barricaded with 
plywood and heavy screens placed over the outside of the first floor windows.  An 
undetermined number of shotguns with shells were observed inside the headquarters” 
(FBI Files, Part 8b, p. 1).
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Interestingly, when the North Carolina Black Panther headquarters were severely 
damaged in a fire, leading to the entry and inventorying of the premises by various 
governmental agencies, only a “limited number of firearms in headquarters” were found 
(FBI Files, Part 8a, p. 22).  Similarly, the official inventory report by the Winston-Salem 
police department, following entry with a search warrant for stolen goods, identified only 
“two U.S. model one nine one seven thirty point zero rifles and one twelve gauge shotgun 
along with numerous items of office equipment, including typewriters, duplicating 
machines, and two cameras” (FBI Files, Part 9a, p.81).  A report in June of 1971, while it 
indicates the group was in possession of approximately a dozen rifles and shotguns, 
expressly notes that none of the weapons constitute a violation of firearms law (FBI Files, 
Part 13b, p. 83).
Intelligence Gathering in North Carolina
The second research question proposed in this study concerns the information 
actually collected by the Charlotte field office and its significance in the social control 
efforts at both the local and national levels.
Use of FBI Intelligence in the North Carolina Area.
Intelligence gathered by the Charlotte field office served two significant purposes 
at the local level.  First, the information gathered was frequently made available to other 
law enforcement agencies, including local police forces.  Second, the scope of the 
information gathered, particularly with regard to internal financial affairs and other 
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struggles, revealed to the Charlotte field office that the Winston-Salem branch of the 
Black Panther Party did not pose much of a threat as a social movement.
Sharing of Information.  Numerous documents in the file contain statements to the 
effect that FBI intelligence was shared with local police forces or some other law 
enforcement agency.  For example, a January 12, 1971 report of planned sniper attacks 
on police forces indicates that “Chief of Police on duty, Captain and Forsty Countyso, 
have been advised and this matter is receiving aggressive attention” (FBI Files, Part 9a, p. 
78).  Similarly, with the transfer of a Panther member under arrest from the local hospital 
to the local jail, the Charlotte report indicates that “High Point PD alert to possible escape 
and rescue attempt” (FBI Files, Part 11b, p. 47).  Reports of a possible armed robbery 
were also shared with other law enforcement authorities (FBI Files, Part 12, p. 163), as 
were numerous reports of planned rallies and demonstrations (FBI Files, Part 1, p. 66; 
FBI Files, Part 3b, p. 12; FBI Files, Part 3b, p. 83; FBI File, Part 4a, pp. 32-34). 
 This sharing of information among different law enforcement agencies assisted 
each agency in their social control efforts.  For example, the FBI was able to occasionally 
warn the local police force of potentially violent events, while police investigation of the 
Panthers contributed to the FBI’s efforts to monitor and track Panther activity.
Evaluation of the Actual Threat Level.  By the midpoint of 1970, Charlotte 
reports regularly contained information that the financial condition of the North Carolina 
Panthers was poor to desperate.  Various reports in July of 1970 provide somewhat 
contradictory information: that the group had such difficulties that members were 
reduced to one meal per day (FBI Files, Part 6b, p. 18), that the group was reduced to 
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charging food for the Breakfast for Children program (FBI Files, Part 6a, p. 23), but that 
the group still had sufficient resources to get along (FBI Files, Part 6, p. 54).  In August 
of 1970, the Charlotte office documented that the Winston-Salem group’s telephone had 
been disconnected for nonpayment, but suggested that the group was still able to pay its 
rent (FBI Files, Part 7b, p. 103).  A September 21, 1970, report referred to the state of 
their finances as “deteriorating,” adding that “contributions from the general public have 
decreased” (FBI Files, Part 7a, p. 35).  By November 20, 1970, Charlotte informant 
reports indicate that “contributions are nonexistent, finances are poor, they are having 
difficulty paying their bills and at times use the newspaper money for expenses.  BPP 
Headquarters is upset because they cannot afford a telephone and their newspaper sales 
are down” (FBI Files, Part 8a, p. 89).  Reports of similar financial difficulties appear in 
December, 1970 (FBI Files, Part 9b, p. 25) and January, 1971 (FBI Files, Part 11b, p. 87).
By April of 1971, informants were reporting that the group was considering armed 
robbery as a means of escaping their financial difficulties (FBI Files, Part 12, p. 94), 
while a July 1971 report indicated the members were trying to obtain food stamps from 
an ex-member as they were “starving” (FBI Files, Part 13b, p. 48).  With the exception of 
a few short periods, this financial difficulty appears to have been a perpetual problem for 
the Winston-Salem group (FBI Files, Part, 14a, p. 28).
Information reported by the Charlotte field office also suggests that the Winston-
Salem Panthers were having less success with their programs than the Panthers publicly 
claimed.  For instance, one report indicates that the group claimed to feed forty children 
per day through the “Breakfast for Children” program, while agent surveillance placed 
the number of participating children at only half that (FBI Files, Part 4a, p. 81).  Later 
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reports place the number of participating children at approximately fifteen, again against 
Black Panther Party claims of feeding thirty to forty children (FBI Files, Part 6a, p. 40).
As the financial difficulties of the group reportedly increased, reports of the Breakfast for 
Children program began to indicate that no more than ten children were being fed, while 
the Party members were consuming food themselves which had been donated for the 
breakfast program (FBI Files, Part 13a, p. 25).
Intelligence on the Liberation School would have likewise shown the Charlotte 
field office that the Panthers were not finding a great deal of success.  The initial launch 
of the Liberation School reportedly failed due to lack of participants (FBI Files, Part, 14c, 
p. 5).  A subsequent report in  August, 1972, indicates that only eight to ten children were 
attending, and that “with the inducement of receiving a free lunch prior to each class” 
(FBI Files, Part 14b, p. 21).
Similarly, although the Panthers’ Free Ambulance Program started off well with 
funding through a large grant, subsequent reports demonstrate that the Charlotte field 
office was aware that this community program was also in great difficulty.  For example, 
one Charlotte report on a funding drive for the ambulance program refers to it as “a 
complete failure” (FBI Files, Part 15b, p. 1).  Another report states:
During May and early June, 1974, donations to the Party 
were good, and the Free Ambulance Program was able to 
operate on a full-time basis, seven days a week, 24 hours a 
day, and Panther members were able to pay monthly bills 
on time without difficulty.  Since early July, 1974, funding 
has again become difficult and the BPP’s ambulance was 
forced to come to a complete halt during August and early 
September, 1974, for lack of funds, and additionally, the 
liability insurance on the ambulance was allowed to lapse 
because of lack of payment . . . .
(FBI Files, Part 15b, p. 19).
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Thus, the intelligence gathered by the Charlotte field office demonstrated in a 
fairly clear manner that the Winston-Salem branch of the Black Panther Party was not a 
significant threat as a social movement organization.  The group simply did not have the 
funds, the membership numbers, or the community support necessary to make much of 
an impact on the social structure of the North Carolina.
Use of FBI Intelligence in National Social Control Efforts.
At the national level, intelligence gathered in North Carolina contributed to the 
body of evidence for a possible Smith Act prosecution against national Black Panther 
leaders and provided feedback on the effectiveness of COINTELPRO measures.  Each of 
these is discussed in turn.
Contributions to Possible Smith Act Prosecutions. As discussed above, the 
Charlotte field office files reflect a significant focus on gathering evidence for the 
possible prosecution of Black Panther Party members for seeking to overthrow the U.S. 
government.  For example, an April 1975 report states:
This investigation is based on information which indicates 
that [redacted] in view of his affiliation with the Black 
Panther Party (BPP) (See Appendix), is engaged in 
activities which could involve a violation of Title 18, 
United States Code, Section 2383 (Rebellion or 
Insurrection), 2384 (Seditious Conspiracy), or 2385 
(Advocating the Overthrow of the United States 
Government).
(FBI Files, Part 15a, p. 46).  Another report, which is captioned “Black Panther Party, 
Racial Matters, Smith Act of 1940, Seditious Conspiracy, Rebellion and Insurrection,” 
discusses the purging of a former Black Panther member (FBI Files, Part 3a, pp. 18-24).
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Although not stated so overtly, numerous other reports provided possible Smith 
Act evidence through tracking the association of individuals within the Black Panther 
Party (FBI Files, Part 1, pp. 80-82; FBI Files, Part 3b, pp. 16-21; FBI Files, Part 7b, pp. 
22-23; FBI Files, Part 8b, pp. 64-65).  Other evidence was provided through transcripts of 
speeches made by Black Panther Party members (FBI Files, Part 5a, p. 58 through Part 
5c, p. 50; FBI Files, Part 6d, pp. 30-70).  Yet additional potential evidence was obtained 
through the collection and validation of handwriting samples of different Panthers (FBI 
Files, Part 4a, pp. 87-88; FBI Files, Part 4b, p. 33). In fact, the FBI considered 
association with the Black Panthers to be such a serious matter that in one instance the 
Charlotte office issued a memo to explain the presence of white Yale college students 
acting as pallbearers at the funeral of an assassinated Black Panther Party leader, so that 
the students would not be considered in sympathy with the Black Panthers (FBI Files Part 
1, p. 6).
While it does not appear that any Black Panther Party members were actually 
charged with sedition, North Carolina intelligence certainly contributed to the decision of 
whether a Smith Act prosecution was a feasible goal.  Further, the Charlotte field office’s 
part in tracking travel of the members, and in transcribing speeches and press conferences 
which occurred in North Carolina, contributed to the general body of FBI knowledge on 
the Black Panther Party.
Analysis of the Effectiveness of COINTELPRO Measures.  Another contribution 
of North Carolina intelligence is found in regular reports on the effects of COINTELPRO 
measures, particularly the FBI’s efforts to create dissension within the Black Panther 
Party.  Beginning in 1971, Charlotte reports regularly comment on the loyalty of the 
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Winston-Salem Panthers to the Huey Newton faction of the Black Panther Party (FBI 
Files, Part 13a, p. 32; FBI Files, Part 13a, p. 94; FBI Files, Part 13b, p. 65; FBI Files, Part 
13b, p. 92; FBI Files, Part 14a, p. 22; FBI Files, Part 14b, p. 7; FBI Files, Part 14c, p. 4; 
FBI Files, Part 15c, p. 59). Although evidence of a split in the national Black Panther 
Party is lacking in the Charlotte files, the continual reporting back on any factionalism 
illustrates the importance that FBI headquarters placed in that particular strategy of social 
control.  The local reports thus assisted in measuring the effectiveness of such tactics in 
destroying the Black Panther Party as a national social movement.
Reinforcement of the Official Frame
The final research question proposed in this study asks whether the reporting of 
locally gathered intelligence serves as a reinforcement of the national official frame.  In 
this section, I first discuss the manner in which Charlotte field office reports reinforced 
the official FBI frame, first by means of the repetitive reporting of violent events, and 
second through the use of language to convey a negative image even where objectively 
Black Panther Party actions seem to have been neither violent nor extremist.  I then 
discuss some instances in which the Charlotte reports actually seem to challenge the 
official frame.
Reinforcement of the National Frame.
The reports from the Charlotte field office to FBI headquarters reinforced the 
official frame of the Black Panther Party as a violent, extremist group in two significant
ways.  First, the established reporting procedure created a situation in which the same 
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negative information was provided repeatedly to FBI headquarters, while positive or 
neutral information, or identified potential threats which never came to pass, tended to be 
reported only a single time.  This served to keep episodes of violence at the forefront, 
even when no new violence had occurred, and also to give the impression that a greater 
number of violent incidents had occurred than the actual number of violent incidents.  
Second, the use of language in the Charlotte field office reports more often than not 
tended to reinforce the official frame, even when reporting on the absence of violent or 
extremist activity.  Each of these is discussed below.
Charlotte Field Office Reporting Procedure.  FBI instructions on reporting 
procedures state “[i]n the event you do not submit an airtel or teletype containing 
significant intelligence information within any two-week period of your investigation, 
submit at the end of that two-week period an airtel summarizing the significant 
developments during the period” (FBI Files, Part 1, p.115).  The Charlotte field office 
interpretation of these instructions appears to have included an immediate report of 
instances, very often a follow-up report with greater details of the incident, periodic 
follow-up with each new development, and inclusion in periodic reports.  Because of this, 
a single incident, or even an informant report of a possible incident, was likely to appear 
in the FBI Files on multiple occasions.
For example, a January 29, 1969 report, apparently based on informant 
information,5 stated:
Black Panther Party members now in Greensboro had 
recently discussed the following.  They suggested that 
some sort of disturbance be formulated in the Negro section 
of Greensboro, and that when a police car answered the call 
5
 As is frequently the case, the identity of the person providing the information has been redacted.
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that rocks and bottles would be thrown at the police car.  
This in turn would cause additional cars to come to the area 
and, when a fairly large congregation of police had 
assembled, then the Black Panthers would “cut down on 
them” with rifles from hidden positions.
(FBI Files, Part 1, p. 123).  This same information is subsequently included in a February 
7, 1969 report (FBI Files, Part 1, p. 119).  It was then incorporated in a report dated 
January 5, 1970, in which the plan was connected with a March 1969 confrontation at a 
local university during which police officers were fired upon (FBI Files, Part 1, p. 74).
This then lent additional credence to an informant report on January 12, 1971 of “plans to 
send out sniper teams tonight to retaliate against police for todays [sic] raid on BPP 
Headquarters” (FBI Files, Part 9a, p. 78), in spite of the fact that no hard evidence was 
ever developed that the North Carolina group had ever utilized snipers against police.
Another example of the repetitive nature of the Charlotte field office’s reporting 
procedures began with an armed confrontation between a group of Panther members and 
a local restaurant owner.  On the date of the incident, August 16, 1969, the Charlotte 
office submitted an urgent report (FBI Files, Part 3b, pp. 67-71). Subsequent reports on 
the confrontation were also provided on August 26, 1969 (FBI Files, Part 3b, pp. 7-8), 
and on October 29, 1969 (FBI Files, Part 3a, pp. 4-5).  This matter was then incorporated 
in a January 5, 1970 report on “Violent Acts” in North Carolina (FBI Files, Part 4a, pp. 
71-72).
Yet another example of repetitive reporting involved a shootout between police 
and Panther members when the police attempted to evict the Panthers from a residence 
they were renting.  The initial incidence was reported on February 10, 1971 (FBI Files, 
Part 11b, p. 39), with a more detailed report of the incident provided later that same day 
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(FBI Files, Part 11b, pp. 27-29).  An additional report of this matter was provided on 
February 12, 1971, including information on criminal charges filed against the five
Panther members present at the time of the shootout, all of whom were teen-agers (FBI 
Files, Part 11b, pp. 41-45).  Yet further reports appear on February 14, 1971, updating 
information on one of the Panther members who had been slightly injured in the 
confrontation (FBI Files, Part 11b, p. 47), and on February 17, 1971, reviewing the 
incident and reporting on arrests made in connection with it (FBI Files, Part 11b, pp52-
54).  A recap of the incident also appears in the April 1971 Smith Act Report (FBI Files, 
Part 12, pp. 136-137).  Finally, in May of 1971, the file contains yet another report, this 
time particularly concerning the trial of the matter, but also including a recap of the 
incidence itself.  (FBI Files, Part 13b, pp. 95-97).  The file continues to contain brief 
mentions of the matter as the trial progressed, each with a short reference to a shootout 
with the police (FBI Files, Part 13b, p. 24; FBI Files, Part 13b, pp. 31-33; FBI Files, Part 
13b, p. 42).  Thus, a single incident involving only five Panthers, all of them very young, 
appeared in at least ten different documents over a period of more than six months.  
While a violent confrontation with police is certainly newsworthy, in none of the 
subsequent reports is there any mention of further violent acts or plans for reprisals.  The 
continual reporting of this matter can only serve to create and reinforce the frame of the 
Black Panther Party as a violent group that targets law enforcement.
A particularly interesting example of repetitive reporting involves an informant 
report that the Winston-Salem Black Panthers, in dire financial straits, were considering 
armed robbery.  The first mention of armed robbery occurs in an “urgent” April 14, 1971 
teletype, which is based on information from someone “with whom there has been 
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insufficient contact from which to judge reliability but who is in a position to furnish 
reliable information:”
[I]t was determined that the group is considering 
committing armed robberies to raise money due to their 
financial difficulties.  During the conversation, the 
possibility of bringing in outside Black Panther Party
members to commit these robberies [was] discussed noting 
major portion of the local Black Panther Party members are 
well known to law enforcement.
Source stressed that no actual target has been 
pointed out, however, this is general discussion among the 
members and in the event their financial situation becomes 
more desperate, the possibility exists that the group will 
plan further in this regard.
(FBI Files, Part 12, pp. 162-163).  The April 1971 Smith Act Report, dated 
approximately one week later, states:
 [redacted] other members of the Black Panther Party at 
Winston-Salem, North Carolina, it was determined that the 
group is considering committing armed robberies to raise 
money due to their current financial difficulties.  Also 
discussed was the possibility of bringing in outside Black 
Panther Party members to commit these robberies, noting 
that the group at Winston-Salem, North Carolina, is well 
known to the local police and other law enforcement and 
appear to be “laying low.”
(FBI Files, Part 12, p. 94).  A third mention of possible plans for armed robberies occurs 
in an April 28, 1971 report, consisting of nothing more than a brief mention (FBI Files, 
Part 12, pp. 151-152).  Although it is impossible to be sure, it appears likely that these 
three reports of possible plans for armed robbery all stem from a single piece of 
informant information, and from a source whose reliability was somewhat questionable.
Moreover, the second and third reports of this matter do not contain the information in 
the first report that no target was mentioned or that this “planning” was at the stage of a 
general discussion of the possibility.  However, there is no point in the files where a 
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potential target is named, nor is there any reference to an actual armed robbery by the 
group.
These examples demonstrate a pattern of reporting within the FBI files in which 
violent incidents, or even mere threats of violence, between members of the Winston-
Salem group and law enforcement or other citizens of the area were included in reports 
repeatedly over the following months.  At a minimum, this process would serve to keep 
examples of violence at the forefront, constantly reinforcing the idea that the Black 
Panther Party was violence prone.  However, due to the frequent repeating of these 
incidents, it is also possible that recipients of these reports received the impression that 
the Black Panther Party engaged in even greater levels of violence than can be factually 
supported.
Even where Charlotte reports do not contain references to incidences of violence 
or to statements the FBI classified as extremist, the reports still paint the Black Panther 
Party in a negative light through the use of warning statements and qualifying words in 
what are otherwise fairly harmless sounding reports.   These uses of language are 
discussed in the following section.
Impressions from Report Language.  Many Charlotte field office reports are 
accompanied by a standard characterization of the Black Panther Party attached as an 
appendix, regardless of the nature of the material in the report. As described above, these 
appendices clearly frame the Black Panther Party as violent and extremist.  Assuming 
that these appendices were, in fact, provided by FBI headquarters, it is interesting that the 
FBI would subsequently require their attachment to reports to be submitted to FBI 
headquarters.  With headquarters fully aware of the contents of the appendices, it would 
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seem that their inclusion with nearly every report could serve little purpose beyond 
reinforcing the official FBI frame of the Black Panther Party.
The use of captions on reports also suggests a reinforcement of the official frame.  
For example, an October 10, 1969 report captioned “Black Panther Party, Racial Matters, 
Smith Act of 1940, Seditious Conspiracy, Rebellion and Insurrection” actually contains 
information on a former Panther who had be purged from the group, with no apparent 
reference to any activity by current Panther membership, seditious or otherwise (FBI 
Files, Part 3a, pp. 18-24). Another report, captioned “Black Panther Party (BPP), RM, 
Smith Act of 1940,” reported on a single purchase of the Black Panther Party newspaper 
(FBI Files, Part 4a, pp. 15-20).  Yet more reports, captioned “Black Panther Party (BPP) 
– Document ‘Revolution and Education’ by Eldridge Cleaver, Racial Matters – Seditious 
Conspiracy Smith Act of 1940,” concerned the residency of possible Panther members in 
New York (FBI Files, Part 4a, pp. 62-63; Part 7b, pp. 33-34).  A February 18, 1970 report 
with the almost identical caption suggested merely that a specified individual would be 
unlikely to cooperate with an interview request (FBI Files, Part 4a, pp. 77-79), while a 
March 16, 1970 report with the almost identical caption discusses efforts to obtain a 
handwriting sample (FBI Files, Part 4a, pp. 87-88).  And yet, despite the relatively 
innocuous content of these documents, their captioning reinforces the idea of the Black 
Panther Party as a seditious organization.
A cautionary warning included in many of the early documents also serves to 
reinforce the official frame of the Black Panther Party as violent.  An August 25, 1969 
document includes this warning on both the first and last pages:
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED DURING 
ALL ENCOUNTERS WITH MEMBERS AND 
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ASSOCIATES OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY AS 
THEY ARE REPORTEDLY ATTEMPTING TO 
PREARRANGE THE LOCATION OF INTERVIEWS IN 
ORDER TO KILL FBI AGENTS.  DUE TO THEIR 
PROVEN RECORD OF ATTEMPTS TO KILL POLICE 
OFFICERS, ALL BLACK PANTHER MEMBERS AND 
ASSOCIATES ARE CONSIDERED ARMED AND 
EXTREMELY DANGEROUS.
(FBI Files, Part 3b, pp. 30, 34, emphasis in original).  Of note, this particular document 
includes no mention of violence either having occurred or being planned for the future.  
This same blanket warning appears on additional reports which include no mention of 
violence (FBI Files, Part 3a. p. 21; FBI Files, Part 3b, p. 16; FBI Files, Part 3b, p. 23; FBI 
Files, Part 3b, p. 49; FBI Files, Part 4b, p. 45). Moreover, the inclusion of such warning 
in reports to the Director of the FBI would seem to have little protective potential for a 
man who was unlikely to ever deal directly with Black Panther Party members, yet the 
warning clearly would serve to reinforce the idea that Panther members are particularly 
violent.
Later reports include a similar warning:
The Black Panther Party (BPP) is a black extremist 
organization started in Oakland, California, in December, 
1966.  It advocates the use of guns and guerilla tactics to 
bring about the overthrow of the United States 
Government.
(FBI Files, Part 14a, p. 66; FBI Files, Part 14b, p. 26; Part 14c, p. 13).  As this blanket 
statement conveys no new intelligence information about the Black Panther Party in 
North Carolina, it is difficult to see what purpose its repeated inclusion in reports serves 
beyond reinforcing the official FBI frame.
Even with regard to the Panthers’ Free Ambulance Program, which the FBI 
acknowledged was generally viewed positively by the local community (FBI Files, Part 
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15a, p. 49), the Panthers were painted as confrontational and unlikely to cooperate with 
local government:
As a result of BPP meetings with County officials, the BPP 
will be permitted to respond to emergency calls in the 
future if requested by the caller and where the call is not 
being handled by the County Ambulance Service.  Any 
decisions in this matter will be made by the County 
Ambulance dispatcher and not by BPP personnel.  The 
potential for confrontation continues, however, as the BPP 
has indicated that it will respond to all calls from the black 
community.
(FBI Files, Part 15b, pp. 81-82), while a similar report suggested “[redacted] advised 
BPP’s intention is to go ahead with emergency ambulance program with or without 
commissioner’s approval as BPP desires confrontation with local police in effort to 
further test community support” (FBI Files, Part 15c, p. 24).
The documents also contain numerous instances of interesting language choice 
and language interpretation, which would suggest that the writers of the reports construed 
everything in the least positive light for the Black Panthers.  For example, after quoting 
an alleged Panther member statement that if white merchants did not move from an area 
following a boycott, the Panthers would do the “next best thing,” the report continues on 
to state that the “next best thing” “obviously meant tearing the place up or burning it 
down (FBI Files, Part 1, p. 44).  However, there is no explanation in the report for why 
this conclusion should be so obvious.  Another report states “[t]hey hold political 
education classes and “liberation schools” where BPP matters are discussed, calling for 
abstinence from alcohol and drugs as this would affect the members’ effectiveness in the 
coming revolution” (FBI Files, Part 7b, p.39).  Abstinence from drugs and alcohol, an act 
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that would seem to be more positive than the alternative, is thus cast in a negative light by 
its association with revolutionary activity.
A report in January, 1973, includes a reference to the appointment of a member of 
the Panthers as a neighborhood coordinator in a city program.  With reference to this 
employment, the report states that “Mrs. MACK does not hold a decision-making 
position regarding how funds are spent within the program, and there is no indication at 
this time of BPP efforts to subvert the activities of the Model Cities Program or to control 
its funds” (FBI Files, Part 14a, p. 5, emphasis added).  Although this report at its base 
level indicated that the Panthers had not done anything wrong in this situation, the phrase 
“at this time” suggests that the Black Panther Party must continue to be monitored for 
this type of interference in city government.  This same report states that “[s]ources 
report that the BPP plans to continue its Survival Day Program as a means of winning 
over the black community” (FBI Files, Part 14a, pp. 6-7), yet another suggestion that the 
community service programs were established to mask the revolutionary intent of the 
Panthers.
The use of qualifying language in other reports more directly calls the 
actions and motivations of the Winston-Salem group into question.  A July 1972 report 
states that:
The BPP chapter suspended their free breakfast for children 
program during June, 1972, when schools were closed for 
the summer.  The BPP chapter, however, periodically 
operates a day care center at BPP headquarters principally 
for children of BPP members who are fed at headquarters.  
For this reason, the BPP chapter continues to solicit cash 
and food donations under the guise of collecting for the free 
breakfast for children program.
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(FBI Files, Part 14b, p. 34).  A June 1972 report spoke of a dance to “raise money for the 
so-called survival programs,” (FBI Files, Part 14b, p. 61, emphasis added), while an 
August 1972 report indicates that the “North Carolina BPP Chapter increased its efforts 
to promote various so-called community survival programs” (FBI Files, Part 14b, p. 20, 
emphasis added).
One report gave an aura of dishonesty to the group, suggesting that Panther 
members were misleading potential donors as to the purpose of donations:
[T]he BPP Chapter at Winston-Salem made a concerted 
effort to solicit donations under the guise of raising an 
appeal bond for the three members of the High Point Four . 
. . .
(FBI Files, Part 14c, p. 30).  Similarly, other reports indicated that the Black Panther 
Party was misusing donations given for a particular purpose:
The BPP Chapter continues to solicit food from local 
merchants to support the Free Breakfast for Children 
Program.  The Pet Milk Dairy has been donating milk on a 
regular basis, and the Merita Bakery, which is located in a 
black neighborhood, has continued to donate food for this 
program.  Sources report that the BPP members themselves 
have been eating most of the food that is donated leaving 
very little for the children.
(FBI Files, Part 14c, p. 77), and:
During May, 1973, sources reported that the National 
Episcopal Church approved a $35,700 grant to the 
Winston-Salem branch of the BPP for the purpose of 
operating a non-emergency medical transportation project 
in Winston-Salem, N.C. . . .  An unknown amount of the 
church money was forwarded to BPP Headquarters, 
Oakland, California, and utilized in Bobby Seale’s run-off 
campaign for Mayor of Oakland.  Also, some of the money 
is projected for recruiting and organizing activities within 
the Winston-Salem BPP.  Additionally, $2,200 of the 
church money has gone for a project known as “Everybody 
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Is A Star.”  This is a profit motivated black business 
venture, instituted and controlled by the BPP . . . .
(FBI Files, Part 15c, p. 34).
Another report suggests that the Black Panther Party staged stories for newspaper 
articles:
The 1/29/72, issue of “The Black Panther” newspaper 
contains an article on Page 9 captioned “Angela Davis Day 
Care Center Raided.”  This article relates to a raid on 
1/4/72 and 1/6/72, by the High Point, N.C., PD and has 
photographs of Eva Thompson [redacted] and Haven 
Henderson [redacted] along with several children. . . .  
[T]he children appearing in the photograph in “The Black 
Panther” newspaper were probably neighborhood children 
rounded up to pose for a photograph for this article.
(FBI Files, Part 14c, pp. 49-50).
As with the repetitive reporting of violent incidents, the use of captioned warnings 
to caution of violent tendencies would serve to reinforce the official FBI frame.  
Similarly, through the use of qualifying language, and through providing alternative 
rationales for Black Panther Party actions, the Charlotte reports continue to fit 
comfortably within the national frame, even when reporting on matters that seemingly do 
not fit within the concept of the Black Panthers as violent and extremist.  However, on 
occasion the Charlotte documents did include statements which challenged the official 
frame.  These instances are discussed in the following section.
Challenges to the National Frame.
Truly positive statements regarding the Black Panther Party do not appear in the 
FBI Files until mid-1971.  The Charlotte field office reported in September of 1971 that 
“[t]here has been no confrontation between the BPP and police and the group appears to 
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be actively promoting their newly adopted ‘community image,’ and have been sprucing-
up their personal dress as well as the appearance of their headquarters” (FBI Files, Part 
13a, p. 84).  An October 1971 report states that “the BPP members who appeared in the 
courtroom during the above trial were very well-dressed and well-behaved, apparently in 
carrying out their new peaceful image.  There has been no confrontation by the BPP and 
police during the past month” (FBI Files, Part 13a, p. 33).  A report from the following 
month indicates that the North Carolina group “continues to follow their new peaceful 
image of community service and there has been no confrontation by the BPP and Police 
during the past month” (FBI Files, Part 13a, p. 25). An October 1972 report regarding a 
Black Panther Party sponsored community rally states:
. . . None of the above speakers made any comments 
regarding confrontations with police and followed the 
opening line of LARRY LITTLE about working within the 
political system.  There were no weapons in evidence 
among the BPP members present and the gathering was 
very peaceful. . . .
A show of force and firepower would not help them 
improve their image at this time. . . .
(FBI Files, Part 14a, pp. 70, 75).  A report dated a full two years later, October of 1974, 
similarly states:
During this period the BPP has made a conscientious effort 
to maintain a non-violent image and no weapons have been 
observed at the BPP headquarters, however, it is not known 
whether or not any weapons are maintained at the 1106-D 
East 19th St. pad.
(FBI Files, Part 15b, p. 11, emphasis added).
Even in these generally complimentary statements, there is the implication that 
this “peaceful image” is nothing more than an image, particularly when enclosed in 
quotation marks as the phrase “community image” was presented in the above referenced 
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September 1971 report.  It is particularly striking that, even after more than two years of 
non-violence, report language continues to speak of the Panthers as presenting an 
“image,” and, as in the October 1974 report, to suggest that this image merely hides the 
true, violent nature of the Black Panther Party.
Furthermore, in spite of this period of apparently peaceful behavior, FBI reports 
continued to contain cautionary warning to the effect that the Black Panther Party was 
“an extremist organization” that “advocates the use of guns and guerilla tactics” (FBI 
Files, Part 13, p. 43; FBI Files, Part 14a, p. 35), and to frequently include the attachment 
of the standard FBI characterization of the Black Panther Party.
However, some of the new community programs were presented in what can only 
be described as a positive manner.  A June 1971 report indicates that “[t]he group is 
adopting community service attitude and a number of the members are attending first aid 
classes” (FBI Files, Part 13b, p. 66).  In August, a report provides follow-up 
documentation that “[s]everal of the BPP members have gotten first aid cards so they can 
legally help in medical situations in the poverty areas of Winston-Salem, N.C.” (FBI 
Files, Part 13a, p. 95).
An August 1972 document reported on a Survival Rally held the previous month, 
calling it “the most ambitious project undertaken by the North Carolina Chapter to date,” 
and recounting that “1,000 bags of groceries and several hundred pairs of childrens tennis 
shoes” were given away at the rally, while the Panthers also provided sickle cell anemia 
tests and the opportunity for voter registration.  Similarly, a September 1972 report 
stated:
During August, 1972, the BPP Chapter’s efforts were 
directed towards soliciting food for a Survival Day Rally 
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which was held on 8/27/72, on the corner of Oak and 10½ 
Streets, Winston-Salem, N.C., one of the poorest 
neighborhoods in Winston-Salem.  Through personal and 
telephonic contact with local merchants, BPP members 
assembled 100 bags of groceries which were given away at 
the 8/27/72, rally.  They also gave free sickle-cell anemia 
tests and encouraged voter registration at the rally.
(FBI Files, Part 14b, p. 2).  Unlike earlier mentions of community service programs in 
Charlotte field office reports, these reports of Survival Day Rallies contain no suggestion 
that they were sponsored only to promote a new and peaceful image. 
The final document in the FBI file, in which the Charlotte field office indicated its 
intent to move investigation of the Black Panther Party to an inactive status, states:
This matter is being placed in an RUC  status within the 
Charlotte Division in view of the fact that activity on the 
part of the BPP at Winston-Salem, N.C., has been non-
violent in nature and no information has been received 
indicating the BPP maintains or has maintained in the past 
fortifications or weapons.  Additionally, no information has 
been received indicating support for or control by the BPP 
in Winston-Salem, N.C., from its national headquarters in 
Oakland, Calif.  It should be noted that information in the 
past indicated that national headquarters of the BPP had 
requested the BPP in Winston-Salem, N.C., to close down 
and members come to national headquarters, however, the 
Winston-Salem unit refused to comply with instructions 
from national headquarters.  At the present time, no BPP 
sponsored activities are functional in Winston-Salem, and 
Larry Little, former leader of the BPP, since its inception in 
Winston-Salem, N.C., is no longer associated with the unit 
and BPP has no means of support other than the sale of 
BPP newspapers.  The BPP in Winston-Salem does not 
present any real or imagined current threat to the security of 
the country and individual members of the BPP in 
Winston-Salem at the present time have been contacted by 
the FBI in the past for purposes of interviews and no 
productive results have been obtained.
(FBI Files, Part 15a, p. 4). This final document challenges the official frame of the Black 
Panther Party in many respects.  Not only does it indicate that the Winston-Salem group 
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is currently non-violent, it also discounts the idea that the group had stockpiled weapons 
previously, contradicting a suggestion contained in numerous prior reports.  Furthermore, 
the document plainly states that the Winston-Salem group is not a security threat, 
challenging the presentation of the Black Panther Party as extremist and in violation of 
the Smith Act of 1940.  The document also suggests that the group continues to 
experience financial difficulties and that it has been unsuccessful in maintaining 
community programs, two areas which had formed the basis of numerous previous 
reports.
Yet, in a significant sense, this final document also preserves the official frame by 
removing the Winston-Salem group from the national Black Panther Party.  By 
indicating that the Winston-Salem group was no longer under the control of the national 
Black Panther Party, and in fact had defied at least one order from Panther headquarters, 
the report strongly implies that the Winston-Salem group is functionally no longer a part 
of the national Black Panther Party.  This suggestion is strengthened by the statements 
that none of the community programs sponsored by the Black Panther Party remain 
operative in the community and that the former leader has left the group.  According to 
this final report, the only continued tie to the Black Panther Party at that time appears to 
have been the sale of the Black Panther Party newspaper. Thus, in the end, the Charlotte 
field office reports arguably continued to reinforce the official frame of the national 
Black Panther Party as violent and extremist, even while allowing that the Winston-
Salem group did not fit within this frame.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
The Black Panther Party emerged in the late 1960s as a social movement 
organization dedicated to ending discrimination against African Americans.  Although 
this goal did not differ from many of the earlier Civil Rights social movement 
organizations, the tactics espoused by the Panthers did.  Where earlier participants in the 
Civil Rights Movement preached non-violence and patience, the Black Panther Party
urged freedom at any cost and spoke of a coming revolution (Abron 1998; Jones and 
Jeffries 1998; Burns 1990).  However, the group also instituted numerous community 
service programs, which were intended to strengthen the black community and relieve the 
suffering of those living in poverty (Abron 1998; Jones and Jeffries 1998).
The Federal Bureau of Investigation reacted to the rise of the Black Panther Party 
in 1968 by calling it “‘the greatest threat to the internal security of the country’” (Gentry 
1991:618; Churchill and Vander Wall 1990b:123).  National FBI documents framed the 
Panthers as a violent, extremist group, dedicated to the overthrow of the United States 
government at all costs.  Black Panther community programs received little public 
attention from the FBI, and when such programs were mentioned it was with the 
suggestion that the programs were “communist inspired” (Cable News Network 1996) 
and purposely designed to mislead the public into supporting the Panthers’ cause (Gentry
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1991).  Throughout the duration of the Black Panther Party movement, the FBI devoted a 
large amount of resources toward its effort to destroy the social movement organization.
This research has examined the social control efforts of the FBI toward the Black 
Panther Party through document analysis of files maintained by the FBI’s Charlotte, 
North Carolina, field office.  The Charlotte office had primary intelligence gathering 
responsibility with respect to a branch of the Black Panther Party based in Winston-
Salem North Carolina.  Although this branch of the Black Panther Party remained largely 
out of the national spotlight, it was active locally and made efforts to establish the main 
Black Panther Party community programs in North Carolina.  The FBI files on the 
Winston-Salem group are comprised of 724 identifiable documents spanning nearly an 
eight year period.
Significant research has been conducted in the area of social movement theory.  
Previous work on resource mobilization, political opportunity and framing in particular 
illuminate the Black Panther Party’s efforts to advance its goals.  Significantly, these 
same social movement theories are also implicated in the FBI’s social control efforts, as 
FBI intelligence gathering focused in part on the financial and political resources 
available to the Panthers.  Further, the FBI continually sought to frame the Black Panther 
Party in a negative light.
Social movement research has also been directed toward the specific area of 
social control, with particular focus on social control tactics of both private individuals 
and governmental entities.  Many of the more extreme social control tactics described in 
the literature were utilized by the FBI, such as creating false internal movement 
documents to sow mistrust within the group or between two social movement 
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organizations, or using the legal system to tie up movement leaders and resources in 
questionable court battles (Jeffries 2002; Churchill and Vander Wall 1990a).  Other 
research into social control has focused on how decisions regarding the allocation of 
social control are made and on the effects of social control on social movement activity.
In particular, previous work on the social movement theories of framing and allocation of 
social control provide the foundation for this paper.
Instructions from FBI headquarters to the Charlotte field office reflect three 
specific goals of the FBI in its social control efforts.  First, intelligence was gathered to 
forewarn law enforcement agencies of planned Black Panther Party activity, particularly 
activity which could lead to potentially violent confrontations.  Second, the Charlotte 
field office was directed to gather evidence for possible preemptive prosecutions under 
the Smith Act of 1940, an anti-sedition statute which makes it a felony to advocate for the 
overthrow of the U.S. government.  Third, Charlotte agents were also to gather evidence 
for possible prosecutions under existing firearm statutes.  These three goals had a direct 
impact on the intelligence gathering activity of the Charlotte field office, with reports to 
FBI headquarters focusing largely on these three areas.
Intelligence information gathered by the Charlotte field office served an important 
role in the social control effort, both at the local level and nationally.  Locally, 
information of potentially violent situations was regularly shared with local police 
departments, improving the ability of local law enforcement agencies to monitor and 
control Black Panther Party sponsored events.  Moreover, the intelligence gathered by the 
Charlotte field office provided a means to evaluate the actual threat posed by the 
Winston-Salem branch of the Black Panther Party as a social movement, over and above 
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any isolated threats of physical violence.  On the national level, intelligence on Black 
Panther activity in North Carolina contributed information toward the FBI effort to 
prosecute Panther leaders under the Smith Act and other statutes, and thus weaken the 
social movement.  Local intelligence also contributed valuable feedback on the 
effectiveness of the Bureau’s COINTELPRO measures, especially the FBI’s efforts to 
cause dissension among national Black Panther Party leaders.
Finally, Charlotte field office reports also illustrate the impact of the official FBI 
frame on local reporting procedures.  During the majority of the investigative period, the 
Charlotte reports mirror the national frame of the Black Panther Party as a violent, 
extremist, revolutionary group, regardless of the current actions and statements of the 
Winston-Salem group.  This reinforcement of the official frame is accomplished in part 
through repetitive reporting of isolated events of violence, which serves to maintain the 
idea of the Black Panther Party as a violent group even through peaceful periods, and also 
to create the impression of greater violence than actually occurred in North Carolina.  
Moreover, qualifying language used within the Charlotte reports serves to discredit any 
potentially positive reports regarding the Winston-Salem Panthers.  It is only near the 
close of the Charlotte field office files that unquestionably positive information emerges 
to challenge the national FBI frame.
This study contributes to the body of social control work through its exploration 
of the connection between national and local social control efforts.  It examines the 
implications of social control decisions made at the national level for local social control 
activity, thus expanding upon the work on the allocation of social control carried out by 
Cunningham (2003a).  Furthermore, this study analyzes the impact of a national frame on 
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local intelligence gathering and reporting procedures, thus contributing to the work of 
Cunningham and Browning (2004) on official frames as a justification for social control 
activity.
The use of historical documents as a single data source imposes some limitations 
on this study.  First, it is possible that relevant documents are missing, although this does 
not appear to be a significant issue in this case.  Second, without interviews with the 
document authors, it is difficult to determine the intent behind the document content.  In 
this particular case, it would be particularly helpful to know whether the official FBI 
frame of the Black Panther Party was shared by Charlotte field agents, or whether instead 
the Charlotte field agents felt compelled to report information consistent with the frame 
in spite of conflicting personal opinions.  Moreover, with a single data source, it is 
impossible to make any judgment as to the objectivity, or lack thereof, of the FBI 
documents.
Further study is needed in this important area of social control. An expanded 
project, utilizing FBI files maintained by other field offices and cross-checking the FBI 
information against records maintained by the Black Panther Party or local newspapers, 
would serve to confirm or disprove the conclusions reached in this study. Additional 
consideration of the national-local interface of social control in the context of other 
agents of social control is also necessary to confirm or disprove the conclusions reached 
herein.  Similarly, comparative case studies with other national social movements which 
have been the subject of social control are needed to consider the possibility of a master 
social control frame.  Further consideration of the implications of official frames for 
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social movement organizations is needed to fully understand the place of such official 
frames in social control theory.
As discussed in this research, documents from the FBI files demonstrate a pattern 
of mutual reinforcement, wherein local FBI reports were closely tailored to meet national 
direction, thus reinforcing national frames and encouraging the escalation of social 
control activity.  In an era when the issue of national social control has returned to the 
high profile experienced during the 1960s, it is clearly worth revisiting the implications 
of social control activity, both for social movement actors and for others who may be 
prevented from hearing a fair representation of the social movement’s message due to 
social control goals, frames and tactics.
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APPENDIX A
Following is a chronological listing of all documents in the FBI file which were 
generated by the Charlotte field office:
1968 Documents
File Pt. Page(s) File Pt. Page(s)
10/29/1968 1 135 12/31/1968 1 131-133
1969 Documents
File Pt. Page(s) File Pt. Page(s)
1/23/1969 1 124-130 6/10/1969 2b 72-78
1/29/1969 1 123 6/11/1969 2b 82
2/7/1969 1 117-122 6/27/1969 2b 53-54
2/17/1969 1 13-15 7/1/1969 2b 70
2/21/1969 1 9 7/2/1969 2b 67
2/24/1969 1 11-12 7/18/1969 2b 44-46
3/4/1969 1 7-8  7/18/1969 2b 48
3/7/1969 1 6 7/23/1969 2b 47
3/28/1969 1 102-106 7/24/1969 2a; b 3-end; 1-
4/18/1969 1 91-97 7/24/1969 2b 55-56
4/22/1969 1 86-87 8/5/1969 3b 87-89
4/22/1969 1 88 8/15/1969 3b 84
5/6/1969 1 81-83 8/16/1969 3b 67-71
5/8/1969 1 73-80 8/16/1969 3b 83
5/9/1969 1 84-85 8/19/1969 3b 72-76
5/12/1969 1 67-71 8/21/1969 3b 37-39
5/19/1969 1 65-66 8/22/1969 3b 79
5/22/1969 1 16-17 8/23/1969 3b 62-66
5/23/1969 1 23-64 8/23/1969 3b 77-78
5/28/1969 2b 51 8/25/1969 3b 11-16
5/29/1969 1 19-22 8/25/1969 3b 30-36
6/2/1969 1 18
88
1969 Documents (cont.)
File Pt. Page(s) File Pt. Page(s)
8/25/1969 3b 40-47 10/2/1969 3a 34-35
8/25/1969 3b 48-54 10/7/1969 3a 25-27
8/25/1969 3b 55-61 10/10/1969 3a 18-24
8/26/1969 3b 2-10 10/24/1969 3a 10-12
8/27/1969 3b 24-29 10/29/1969 3a 3-9 
8/28/1969 3b 17-22 10/30/1969 5c 67-73
8/29/1969 3b 23 11/3/1969 5a-5c 58-; all; -50
9/15/1969 3a 79-80 11/10/1969 5c 53-54
9/16/1969 3a 73-75 11/10/1969 5c 58-62
9/17/1969 3a 44-63 12/16/1969 4b;5a 68-90; 2-45
9/17/1969 3a 71-72 12/16/1969 5a 47-48
9/19/1969 3a 70 12/17/1969 4b 66-67
9/26/1969 3a 28-32 12/17/1969 5a 46
9/29/1969 3a 42-43 12/23/1969 4b 42-46
10/1/1969 3a 39-41 12/31/1969 4b 51-56
1970 Documents
File Pt. Page(s) File Pt. Page(s)
1/5/1970 4a 70-76 5/5/1970 4a 31
1/8/1970 4b 27-31 5/6/1970 4a 15-20
1/23/1970 4b 41 5/6/1970 4a 29-30
1/29/1970 4b 32-36 5/13/1970 4a 13-14
2/12/1970 4b 18 5/17/1970 4a 23-28
2/18/1970 4a 77-79 5/22/1970 4a 3
2/26/1970 4b 10 5/27/1970 6d 30-70
3/12/1970 4a 47-48 5/28/1970 6c; 6d 70-end; 1-20
3/13/1970 4a 45-46 5/28/1970 6d 75
3/13/1970 4a 80-86 6/1/1970 6d 27-28
3/16/1970 4a 87-88 6/2/1970 6d 21-22
3/19/1970 4a 66-67 6/5/1970 6c 62-63
3/19/1970 4a 68-69 6/9/1970 6c 60
3/30/1970 4a 62-63 6/11/1970 1 3-4 
4/3/1970 4a 36-38 6/12/1970 6c 59
4/15/1970 4a 39-44 6/17/1970 6c 47-50
4/30/1970 4a 32-34 6/17/1970 6c 57-58
5/3/1970 4a 35 6/18/1970 6c 42-46
5/5/1970 4a 5-10 6/19/1970 6c 28-32
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1970 Documents (cont.)
File Pt. Page(s) File Pt. Page(s)
6/19/1970 6c 38-40 9/4/1970 8b 56-60
6/19/1970 6c 41 9/4/1970 7a 53-58
6/19/1970 6c 55-56 9/11/1970 7a 42
6/22/1970 6c 25 9/11/1970 7a 45-46
6/26/1970 6c 26-27 9/14/1970 7a 52
6/26/1970 6c 36 9/18/1970 7a 39
7/7/1970 6b 16-20 9/21/1970 7a 32-36
7/8/1970 6c 11-18 9/24/1970 7a 30-31
7/8/1970 6c 21 9/29/1970 7a 37-38
7/8/1970 6c 22-24 10/1/1970 7a 24-29
7/13/1970 6b; 6c 27-end; 1-6  10/2/1970 7a 21-23
7/14/1970 6c 7-10 10/5/1970 8a 97-end; 1-2 
7/16/1970 6b 1-10 10/5/1970 7a 9-14
7/17/1970 6b 21-26 10/7/1970 7a 19-20
7/26/1970 6c 15 10/12/1970 8b 83-90
7/27/1970 6b 74-77 10/15/1970 8b 91-93
7/27/1970 6b 13-14 10/15/1970 7a 4
7/28/1970 6b 11-12 10/16/1970 8b 75-80
7/30/1970 6a 99-100 10/17/1970 8b 96-97
7/31/1970 6a 3-70 10/20/1970 8b 61-63
8/3/1970 7b 101-105 10/20/1970 8b 18-23
8/4/1970 7b 33-34 10/21/1970 8b 69
8/5/1970 7b 36-98 10/23/1970 8b 64-65
8/10/1970 7b 24 10/26/1970 8b 30-55
8/11/1970 7b 22-23 10/28/1970 8b 12-17
8/12/1970 7b 30-31 10/28/1970 8b 26-29
8/14/1970 7b 19-21 10/30/1970 8b 3
8/19/1970 7b 9-12 11/4/1970 8a 15-18
8/19/1970 7b 3-5  11/6/1970 8a 92-96
8/20/1970 7b 13-14 11/16/1970 8a 40-41
8/20/1970 7b 15-16 11/17/1970 8a 79-86
8/24/1970 7b 2 11/18/1970 8a 37-39
8/25/1970 7b 1 11/18/1970 8b 4
8/31/1970 7a 105 11/20/1970 8a 87-89
9/1/1970 7a 103-104 11/20/1970 8a 9-14
9/2/1970 7a 59 11/25/1970 8a 42-78
9/2/1970 7a 99 11/27/1970 8a 19-20
9/3/1970 7a 62-98 11/27/1970 8a 22-23
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1970 Documents (cont.)
File Pt. Page(s) File Pt. Page(s)
11/27/1970 8a 33-36 12/18/1970 9b;c 34-end; 1-56
12/3/1970 9c 73-78 12/22/1970 9b 23-25
12/4/1970 9b 6-9  12/24/1970 9b 26
12/4/1970 9c 60-72 12/24/1970 9b 29
12/11/1970 9b 30-33
1971 Documents
File Pt. Page(s) File Pt. Page(s)
1/4/1971 11b 75-77 2/10/1971 11b 62-63
1/4/1971 9b 16-17 2/12/1971 11b 6
1/6/1971 9b 18 2/12/1971 11b 41-45
1/7/1971 9a 73-74 2/13/1971 11b 55-56
1/7/1971 9b 13-15 2/14/1971 11b 47
1/8/1971 9a 77 2/15/1971 11b 61
1/8/1971 9a 79-80 2/16/1971 11b 46
1/8/1971 9b 10 2/18/1971 11b 34-35
1/12/1971 9a 68-69 2/22/1971 11a 87-89
1/12/1971 9a 78 2/23/1971 11b 33
1/12/1971 9a;9b 81-end; 1-2  2/26/1971 11a 97
1/12/1971 9b 4-5  3/1/1971 11b 11-12
1/13/1971 9b 3 3/1/1971 11b 13-19
1/14/1971 11b 69-70 3/2/1971 11b 7
1/14/1971 9a 6-56 3/3/1971 11b 8-10
1/15/1971 9a 70-72 3/5/1971 11a 83-84
1/18/1971 9a 75-76 3/7/1971 11b 4-5 
1/19/1971 9a 3-4  3/8/1971 11a 54-57
1/19/1971 9a 59-60 3/8/1971 11b 1-3 
1/19/1971 9a 61-63 3/9/1971 11a 85-86
1/20/1971 11b 85-87 3/10/1971 11a 65-78
1/22/1971 11b 73-74 3/19/1971 11a 41-47
1/22/1971 10a;10b 3-90; 1-87 3/22/1971 11a 38-40
1/25/1971 9a 57-58 3/23/1971 11a 52-53
1/29/1971 11b 95-96 3/23/1971 11a 50-51
1/29/1971 9a 5 3/29/1971 12 175-177
2/4/1971 11b 22-26 4/5/1971 12 166-169
2/10/1971 11b 27-29 4/7/1971 11a 3-33
2/10/1971 11b 39 4/8/1971 11a 34-35
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1971 Documents (cont.)
File Pt. Page(s) File Pt. Page(s)
4/9/1971 12 178 9/21/1971 13a 69-72
4/13/1971 12 170-171 9/21/1971 13a 58-59
4/14/1971 12 162-165 9/21/1971 13a 60-61
4/22/1971 12 3-146 9/22/1971 13a 73-74
4/27/1971 12 149-150 9/23/1971 13a 53-56
4/27/1971 12 148 9/23/1971 13a 65
4/28/1971 12 151-152 9/24/1971 13a 57
4/29/1971 12 153-157 9/27/1971 13a 62-63
5/5/1971 13b 90-92 9/29/1971 13a 48
5/5/1971 13b 99-100 10/4/1971 13a 30-33
5/7/1971 13b 95-97 10/7/1971 13a 44
5/27/1971 13b 85-89 10/14/1971 13a 28-29 
5/31/1971 13b 81-82 10/20/1971 13a 34-37
6/3/1971 13b 83 11/5/1971 13a 22-25
6/4/1971 13b 64-66 11/5/1971 13a 20-21
6/15/1971 13b 69-76 11/5/1971 13a 26
6/29/1971 13b 56-58 11/5/1971 14c 95-96
7/7/1971 13b 38-40 11/9/1971 14c 88-94
7/19/1971 13b 46-48 11/10/1971 14c 69-70
7/20/1971 13b 41-44 11/12/1971 13a 9-10
7/20/1971 13b 49-50 11/12/1971 13a 11-19
7/26/1971 13b 31 11/19/1971 13a 3-6 
7/29/1971 13b 22-27 12/7/1971 14c 65-68
8/6/1971 13a 92-95 12/8/1971 14c 82-83
8/13/1971 13b 14-15 12/14/1971 14c 87
8/17/1971 13b 10-12 12/15/1971 14c 85-86
8/19/1971 13b 1-3  12/17/1971 14c 84
8/26/1971 13a 96-97 12/20/1971 14c 76-79
8/27/1971 13a 99 12/22/1971 14c 72
9/1/1971 13a 87-88 12/22/1971 14c 73
9/7/1971 13a 82-84 12/22/1971 14c 74
9/18/1971 13a 75-78 12/22/1971 14c 75
9/20/1971 13a 79-81 12/22/1971 14c 80-81
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1972 Documents
File Pt. Page(s) File Pt. Page(s)
1/4/1972 14c 58-61 2/4/1972 14c 49-50
1/16/1972 14c 63-64 2/18/1972 14c 40-42
1/20/1972 14c 54-57 3/2/1972 14c 32-34
1/25/1972 14c 53 3/8/1972 14c 38
2/4/1972 14c 45-48 3/13/1972 14c 37
3/17/1972 14c 35-36 8/4/1972 14b 18-22
3/21/1972 14c 29-31 8/21/1972 14b 14-17
4/5/1972 14c 2-6  8/25/1972 14b 9-11
4/5/1972 14c 7-26 8/27/1972 14b 12-13
4/18/1972 14b;14c 98-end; 1 9/5/1972 14b 5-8 
4/19/1972 14b 94-96 9/20/1972 14b 1-4 
4/29/1972 14b 91-92 10/2/1972 14a 90-91
5/5/1972 14b 82-84 10/3/1972 14a 97
5/10/1972 14b 80-81 10/4/1972 14a 92-96
5/19/1972 14b 77-79 10/17/1972 14a 84-87
5/30/1972 14b 76 10/20/1972 14a 79-82
6/5/1972 14b 69-72 10/25/1972 14a 83
6/20/1972 14b 60-63 10/31/1972 14a 61-78
6/20/1972 14b 65-66 11/3/1972 14a 56-60
6/23/1972 14b 53-55 11/17/1972 14a 41-44
6/26/1972 14b 56-58 11/17/1972 14a 45-53
6/29/1972 14b 40-43 11/19/1972 14a 25-28
6/29/1972 14b 49 11/20/1972 14a 36-40
6/30/1972 14b 50 12/7/1972 14a 21-24
7/5/1972 14b 36-39 12/7/1972 14a 33-35
7/6/1972 14b 44-48 12/12/1972 14a 31-32
7/20/1972 14b 33-35 12/15/1972 14a 29-30
7/29/1972 14b 31-32 12/26/1972 14a 9-15
8/1/1972 14b 23-30 12/27/1972 14a 16-20
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1973 Documents
File Pt. Page(s) File Pt. Page(s)
1/4/1973 14a 3-7  6/29/1973 15c 32-38
1/4/1973 14a 8 8/30/1973 15c 30-31
1/15/1973 15c 82-86  8/31/1973 15c 18-22
1/19/1973 15c 79-81 9/7/1973 15c 26-29
2/5/1973 15c 71-78 9/10/1973 15c 23-25
3/2/1973 15c 66-70 9/11/1973 15c 15-17
3/20/1973 15c 63-65 9/13/1973 15c 10-14
3/22/1973 15c 61-62 9/28/1973 15c 3-6 
4/2/1973 15c 57-60 10/3/1973 15b;15c 84-end; 1-2 
4/12/1973 15c 39-56
1974 Documents
File Pt. Page(s) File Pt. Page(s)
1/3/1974 15b 78-83 7/3/1974 15b 43-47
1/23/1974 15b 76-77 7/30/1974 15b 48
4/2/1974 15b 49-53 9/16/1974 15b 35-40
4/2/1974 15b 56-75 9/30/1974 15b 12-34
5/16/1974 15b 54 10/4/1974 15b 7-11
5/16/1974 15b 55 10/25/1974 15b 4-6 
 
1975 Documents
File Pt. Page(s) File Pt. Page(s)
1/8/1975 15a;15b 87-end; 1-3  4/1/1975 15a 44-47
1/25/1975 15a 85-86 4/4/1975 15a 39-43
2/14/1975 15a 79-82 5/28/1975 15a 37-38
2/25/1975 15a 73-76 6/11/1975 15a 34-36
2/25/1975 15a 83 7/28/1975 15a 29-31
3/4/1975 15a 48-55 9/4/1975 15a 28
3/6/1975 15a 59-63 9/8/1975 15a 27
3/6/1975 15a 66-72 10/30/1975 15a 14-26
3/17/1975 15a 56-58
1976 Documents
File Pt. Page(s)
4/5/1976 15a 3-13
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APPENDIX B
Following is a chronological listing of all documents in the FBI file which were 
generated by the FBI headquarters: 
1969 Documents
File Pt. Page(s) File Pt. Page(s)
2/17/1969 1 115-116 7/10/1969 2b 57-59
3/13/1969 1 10 7/17/1969 2b 52
3/27/1969 1 107-110 8/14/1969 3b 80-82
3/27/1969 1 111-114 9/2/1969 3a 86
6/4/1969 2b 64-66 9/10/1969 3a; 3b 87-89; 1
6/16/1969 2b 63 9/30/1969 3a 68-69
6/16/1969 2b 79-81 10/2/1969 3a 36-37
7/2/1969 2b 60-62 10/3/1969 3a 38
7/8/1969 2b 68-69 12/1/1969 5a 54-55
1970 Documents
File Pt. Page(s) File Pt. Page(s)
1/5/1970 4b 63-64 5/26/1970 6d 71-72
1/6/1970 4b 65 6/11/1970 6c 61
1/19/1970 4b 26 8/20/1970 7b 6-7 
2/5/1970 4b 23-25 9/16/1970 7a 51
2/5/1970 4b 37-39 10/15/1970 7a 3
3/13/1970 4b 1-4 
 
12/3/1970 8a 28-29
1971 Documents
File Pt. Page(s) File Pt. Page(s)
2/2/1971 11b 83-84 9/27/1971 13a 49-50
2/17/1971 11b 20-21 9/29/1971 13a 51-52
3/31/1971 11a 48-49 10/21/1971 13a 38-39
9/21/1971 13a 64
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1972 Documents
File Pt. Page(s) File Pt. Page(s)
10/16/1972 14a 88-89
1974 Documents
File Pt. Page(s) File Pt. Page(s)
8/7/1974 15b 42 9/27/1974 15b 4
1975 Documents
File Pt. Page(s) File Pt. Page(s)
1/27/1975 15a 84 3/21/1975 15a 64-65
2/27/1975 15a 77-78 6/13/1975 15a 32-33
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APPENDIX C
Following is a chronological listing of all documents in the FBI file which were 
generated by field offices6 other than the Charlotte field office: 
1968 Documents
File Pt. Page(s) File Pt. Page(s)
12/16/1968 1 134
1969 Documents
File Pt. Page(s) File Pt. Page(s)
4/1/1969 1 98-101 10/21/1969 3a 15-16
4/23/1969 1 89-90 10/21/1969 3a 17
5/15/1969 1 72 10/24/1969 3a 13-14 *
5/27/1969 2b 83-84 11/5/1969 5c 65-66
6/4/1969 1 5 11/6/1969 5c 63-64
6/19/1969 2b 71 11/13/1969 5c 55-57
7/15/1969 2b 49-50 11/18/1969 5c 51-52
7/30/1969 3b 90 12/1/1969 5a 53
8/12/1969 3b 85-86 12/2/1969 5a 50-51
8/19/1969 3a 64-65 12/5/1969 5a 49
9/9/1969 3a 81-85 12/11/1969 5a 52
9/15/1969 3a 66-67 12/18/1969 4b 49-50
9/17/1969 3a 76 12/23/1969 4b 57
9/18/1969 3a 77-78 12/23/1969 4b 58
10/2/1969 3a 33 12/31/1969 4b 59-62
10/9/1969 5a 56-57
6
*New York field office, **Richmond field office, #Atlanta field office, ##Philadelphia field office, all 
other documents generated by the San Francisco field office.
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1970 Documents
File Pt. Page(s) File Pt. Page(s)
1/7/1970 4b 40 8/12/1970 7b 26
1/8/1970 4b 47-48 8/12/1970 7b 27-28
2/5/1970 4b 13-14 8/12/1970 7b 29
2/6/1970 4b 19-20 8/12/1970 7b 35
2/11/1970 4b 21-22 8/13/1970 7b 25
2/13/1970 4b 15-17 8/18/1970 7b 8
2/17/1970 4b 11-12 8/19/1970 7b 17
2/26/1970 4a 55-56 8/19/1970 7b 18
3/3/1970 4a 89-90 8/27/1970 7a 106
3/6/1970 4b 7-9  9/3/1970 7a 100
3/9/1970 4b 6 9/3/1970 7a 101
3/13/1970 4b 5 9/3/1970 7a 102
4/1/1970 4a 58-60 9/8/1970 7a 60-61
4/2/1970 4a 61 9/11/1970 7a 47-49
4/2/1970 4a 64-65 9/14/1970 7a 40-41
4/13/1970 4a 57 9/14/1970 7a 43
4/15/1970 4a 51-52 9/15/1970 7a 50
4/15/1970 4a 53-54 9/16/1970 7a 44
4/17/1970 4a 49-50 10/10/1970 7a 15-18
5/7/1970 6d 73-74 10/14/1970 8b 94-95 *
5/8/1970 4a 21-22 10/15/1970 7a 5
5/12/1970 4a 11-12 10/15/1970 7a 6
5/18/1970 4a 4 10/15/1970 7a 7-8  
5/22/1970 6d 25-26 10/16/1970 8b 66
5/27/1970 6d 23-24 10/16/1970 8b 68
5/28/1970 6d 29 10/16/1970 8b 70-72
6/9/1970 6c 66-67 10/16/1970 8b 73-74
6/11/1970 6c 64-65 10/20/1970 8b 81-82
6/12/1970 6c 68-69 10/23/1970 8b 67
6/17/1970 6c 51-52 10/29/1970 8b 25 *
6/18/1970 6c 53-54 * 10/29/1970 8b 24
6/19/1970 6c 34-35 11/6/1970 8b 7-8  
6/22/1970 6c 33 * 11/6/1970 8b 9
6/26/1970 6c 37 11/6/1970 8b 11
7/8/1970 6c 19-20 11/13/1970 8a 91 *
7/27/1970 6a 78-79 11/16/1970 8b 10
7/31/1970 6a 71 11/19/1970 8a 90
7/31/1970 6a 72-73 11/30/1970 8a 3-4 
 
8/10/1970 7b 32 11/30/1970 8a 7-8 
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1970 Documents (cont.)
File Pt. Page(s) File Pt. Page(s)
12/3/1970 8a 24 12/8/1970 9b 79-80
12/3/1970 8a 25 12/8/1970 8a 5
12/3/1970 8a 26-27 12/9/1970 9b 20-22
12/3/1970 8a 30-31 12/15/1970 9b 59
12/4/1970 8a 21 12/29/1970 9b 27
12/4/1970 8a 32 12/29/1970 9b 28
12/7/1970 8a 6 12/31/1970 9b 57-58
1971 Documents
File Pt. Page(s) File Pt. Page(s)
1/12/1971 9b 11 2/17/1971 11b 52
1/12/1971 9b 12 2/17/1971 11b 53-54
1/19/1971 9a 64 2/17/1971 11b 60
1/19/1971 9a 65 2/23/1971 11b 30-31
1/19/1971 9a 66 2/23/1971 11b 32
1/27/1971 11b 71-72 2/24/1971 11a 79-80
1/27/1971 11b 78-79 3/3/1971 11a 90
1/27/1971 11b 80 3/4/1971 11a 92
1/27/1971 11b 81-82 3/4/1971 11a 93-94
1/27/1971 11b 88-89 3/9/1971 11a 91
1/27/1971 10b 88-89 3/9/1971 11a 96
1/29/1971 11b 87 3/11/1971 11a 95
1/31/1971 9b 19 3/16/1971 11a 82
2/2/1971 11b 90-91 3/18/1971 11a 63-64
2/2/1971 11b 92 3/19/1971 11a 81
2/2/1971 11b 93 3/25/1971 11a 58-59
2/2/1971 11b 94 3/25/1971 11a 60
2/4/1971 11b 57-59 3/25/1971 11a 61 **
2/9/1971 11b 66 3/25/1971 11a 62
2/9/1971 11b 67 4/6/1971 11a 36
2/9/1971 11b 68 4/6/1971 11a 37
2/11/1971 11b 64-65 4/6/1971 12 174
2/13/1971 11b 40 4/13/1971 12 172
2/16/1971 11b 36 4/13/1971 12 173
2/16/1971 11b 48 4/24/1971 12 160-161
2/16/1971 11b 50-51 4/26/1971 12 158-159
2/17/1971 11b 37-38 4/29/1971 12 147
2/17/1971 11b 49 5/6/1971 13b 101-102
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1971 Documents (cont.)
File Pt. Page(s) File Pt. Page(s)
5/11/1971 13b 98 8/10/1971 13b 17
5/20/1971 13b 93-94 8/10/1971 13b 18-19
6/1/1971 13b 84 8/16/1971 13b 16
6/15/1971 13b 77 8/17/1971 13b 4
6/15/1971 13b 78-80 8/19/1971 13b 13
6/22/1971 13b 67-68 8/25/1971 13b 8
6/29/1971 13b 61 8/25/1971 13b 9
6/29/1971 13b 62-63 8/30/1971 13a 98
7/1/1971 13b 59-60 9/1/1971 13a 89-90
7/14/1971 13b 53-54 9/1/1971 13a 91
7/14/1971 13b 55 9/13/1971 13a 86
7/15/1971 13b 52 9/15/1971 13a 85
7/19/1971 13b 51 9/23/1971 13a 66
7/23/1971 13b 45 9/27/1971 13a 67-68
7/26/1971 13b 34 10/4/1971 13a 45-46 #
7/27/1971 13b 32-33 10/5/1971 13a 47 ##
7/27/1971 13b 37 10/7/1971 13a 40-41
7/29/1971 13b 36 10/8/1971 13a 42-43
7/30/1971 13b 35 11/1/1971 13a 27
8/3/1971 13b 28 11/30/1971 13a 8
8/3/1971 13b 29 12/1/1971 13a 7
8/3/1971 13b 30 12/8/1971 14c 97
8/6/1971 13b 21 12/27/1971 14c 71
8/9/1971 13b 20
1972 Documents
File Pt. Page(s) File Pt. Page(s)
1/4/1972 14c 62 5/4/1972 14b 90
1/24/1972 14c 51 5/8/1972 14b 88
1/25/1972 14c 52 5/18/1972 14b 86-87
2/15/1972 14c 43-44 5/22/1972 14b 85
2/29/1972 14c 39 6/12/1972 14b 75
3/22/1972 14c 28 6/15/1972 14b 73
4/5/1972 14c 27 6/15/1972 14b 74
4/20/1972 14b 97 6/20/1972 14b 51-52
4/26/1972 14b 93 6/20/1972 14b 59
5/4/1972 14b 89 6/20/1972 14b 64
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1972 Documents
File Pt. Page(s) File Pt. Page(s)
6/20/1972 14b 67 11/20/1972 14a 55
6/20/1972 14b 68
1973 Documents
File Pt. Page(s) File Pt. Page(s)
10/4/1973 15c 7-9 
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